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INTRODUCTION

Background

Over fifty years ago Justice Cardozo wrote, "Liberty of contract is not
an absolute concept. It is relative to many conditions of time and place and
* Assistant Professor of Law, Baylor University. B.A., M.A., J.D., University of Arkansas; LL.M., University of Illinois. The author wishes to give special
thanks to Elaine W. Shoben for her valuable insights and comments on earlier drafts
of this Article.
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circumstance. The constitution has not ordained that the forms of business
shall be cast in imperishable moulds."' The limits of contractual freedom in
the non-union workplace have been challenged in favor of a policy of protecting at-will employees from abusive discharge. In response, employers have
defended their actions by relying upon the common law rule of employment
at-will which, as formulated in the United States, 2 provides that an employer
1. Hartford Accident Co. v. Nelson Co., 291 U.S. 352, 360-61 (1934).
2. The English common law, as articulated by Blackstone, presumed that an
employment for indefinite term was a hiring for one year:
If the hiring be general, without any particular time limited, the law construes
it to be a hiring for a year; upon a principle of natural equity, that the
servant shall serve, and the master maintain him, throughout all the revolutions of the respective seasons, as well when there is work to be done, as
when there is not, but the contract may be made for any larger or smaller
term.
W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 425. This presumption could be rebutted, however,
by showing that the contracting parties considered a custom of trade with a shorter
duration. See C. SmrH, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND S

~vANT

53 (1852);

Feinman, The Development of the Employment At Will Rule, 20 Am.J. LEois. HIsT.
118, 119-20 (1976); Murg & Sharman, Employment at Will: Do the Exceptions Overwhelm the Rule?, 23 B.C.L. REv. 329, 332 (1982). Although originally formulated
to protect seasonal agricultural workers and domestic workers, the English rule was
gradually extended to include all classes of servants. See C. SMIrH, supra, at 51-57.
The initial American interpretation of the employment at will rule generally
mirrored the English law principles of mutual interest and responsibilities of master
and servant, but later developments in the mid-nineteenth century industrial revolution
reflected the use of laissez-faire economics and concomitant reliance on formalistic
interpretation of contracts. See Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311,
319, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 921 (1981); Feinman, supra, at 122-25; Note, Protecting at
Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good
Faith, 93 HAav. L. Ruv. 1816, 1824 (1980); see also P. SELZNICK, LAw, SoCIETY Am
INDUSTRIAL JusTicE 123 (1969) (18th century law of master and servant viewed the

master-servant relationships as status based where custom and public policy shaped
the framework of mutual rights and obligations of the parties, rather than being
contractually defined by the will of the parties).
Some early American courts looked to the period of payment as determinative
of the term of employment. E.g., Moline Lumber Co. v. Harrison, 128 Ark. 260,
194 S.W. 25 (1917); Pinckney v. Talmage, 32 S.C. 364, 10 S.E. 1083 (1890). Other
courts assigned to the jury the role of ascertaining the intent of the parties. Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, -, 710 P.2d 1025, 1030-31
(1985); Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., 193 Conn. 558, 563, 479 A.2d 781, 784 (1984);
see also Graves v. Lyon Bros. &Co., 110 Mich. 670, 68 N.W. 985 (1896); Chamberlain
v. Detroit Stove Works, 103 Mich. 124, 61 N.W. 532 (1894). In Darlington v. General
Elec., 350 Pa. Super. 183, 504 A.2d 306 (1986), the court stated:
The at-will presumption flourished in the laissez-faire climate of the latter
part of the last century. The philosophy of "freedom of contract," of which
the at-will presumption was a manifestation, served to fuel the furnace of
the free enterprise system. Because commerce was king, laws were tailored
to facilitate business and courts were very much disinclined to impede the
natural workings of the free enterprise system. Thus laws were developed

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol52/iss4/2

2

EMPLOYMENT A T WILL

1987]

Tabb: Tabb: Employee Innocence
has absolute power to discharge an employee for "good cause, for no cause,
or even cause morally wrong. ' 3 Sensitive to the potential for unfair hardship
whereby courts largely left business decisions to businessmen.
Id. at

-,

504 A.2d at 309.

Resolution of the American position on at-will employment crystallized in the
classic treatise by Horace Wood in 1877, where he stated:
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is prima
facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring,
the burden is upon him to establish it by proof. A hiring at so much a day,
week, month, or year, no time being specified, is an indefinite hiring, and
no presumption attaches that it was for a day even, but only at the rate
fixed for whatever time the party may serve. It is competent for either party
to show what the mutual understanding of the parties was in reference to
the matter; but unless their understanding was mutual that the service was
to extend for a certain fixed and definite period, it is an indefinite hiring
and is determinable at the will of either party....
H. WOOD, A TREATISE ON TEm LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134, at 272 (1877).
Wood's reliance on certain cases which supported his formulation of the rule has
been largely discredited as being misplaced. See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield,
408 Mich. 579, 602 & nn.13-14, 292 N.W.2d 880, 886-87 & nn.13-14 (1980); Note,
Protecting Employees at Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1931, 1933 (1983); Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job
Security, 26 STAN. L. REv. 335, 341-45 (1974).
The New York Court of Appeals adopted Wood's rule in 1895 in Martin v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 118, 42 N.E. 416, 417 (1895), and it gained
widespread acceptance as the prevailing American doctrine. 1 C. LABATT, CoMMENTA.IES ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 159 (2d ed. 1913); 1 S. WILLISTON,
A TREATISE ON TE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 39, at 61-64 (1921).

3. Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), overruled
on other grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915). In Payne,
the court stated:
All may dismiss their employees at will, be they many or few, for good
cause, for no cause or even for cause morally wrong, without being thereby
guilty of legal wrong .... The sufficient and conclusive answer to the many

plausible arguments to the contrary, portraying the evil to workmen and to
others from the exercise of such authority by the great and strong, is: They
have the right to discharge their employees. The law cannot compel them
to employ workmen, nor to keep them employed. If they break contracts
with workmen they are answerable only to them; if in the act of discharging
them, they break no contract, then no one can sue for loss suffered thereby.
Trade is free; so is employment. The law leaves employer and employee to
make their own contracts; and these, when made, it will enforce; beyond
this it does not go. Either the employer or employee may terminate the
relation at will, and the law will not interfere, except for contract broke.
This secures to all civil and industrial liberty.
Id.; see also Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, -,
710
P.2d 1025, 1030-31 (1985); Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., 193 Conn. 558, 563, 479
A.2d 781, 784 (1984); Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284,
, 491
A.2d 1257, 1260 (1985); Darlington v. General Elec., 350 Pa. Super. 183,
, 504
A.2d 306, 309 (1986); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 227-28,
685 P.2d 1081, 1084 (1984); Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702, 704
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upon employees through strict adherence to the at-will rule, courts have
created three limitations on the discretion of employers to fire at-will employees: (1) through recognizing a tort cause of action where an employer's
conduct contravenes an important public policy, 4 (2) by finding a breach of
implied-in-fact contract terms of an employment commitment for a specific
duration or for discharge only upon "good cause," typically based upon
5
assurances of job security contained in company handbooks or manuals,
and (3) by finding a breach of an implied-in-law contractual covenant of
good faith and fair dealing that the employer shall not act in a manner which
6
deprives the employee of the fruits of the employment agreement.

(Wyo. 1985); 9 S. WILLISTON, A

TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1017, at
129-30 (3d ed. 1967).
4. See, e.g., Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983);
Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025 (1985);
Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25
(1959); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980);
Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Haw. 370, 652 P.2d 625 (1982); Frampton v.
Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Trombetta v. Detroit,
Toledo & Ironton Rail Co., 81 Mich. App. 489, 265 N.W.2d 385 (1978); Boyle v.
Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (noted at 52 Mo. L. Rnv.
677 (1987)); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975); Thompson v. St. Regis
Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank,
162 W. Va. 116, 246 S.E.2d 270 (1978).
5. See Ellis v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 754 F.2d 884 (10th Cir. 1985)
(applying New Mexico law); Rupinsky v. Miller Brewing Co., 627 F. Supp. 1181
(W.D. Pa. 1986) (applying North Carolina law); Kistler v. Life Care Centers of
America, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 1268 (D. Kan. 1985); Ring v. R.J. Reynolds Indus., 597
F. Supp. 1277 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Eales v. Tanana Valley Medical-Surgical Group, Inc.,
663 P.2d 958 (Alaska 1983); Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hosp., 141 Ariz.
544, 688 P.2d 170 (1984); see also Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d
311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981); Shah v. American Synthetic Rubber Corp., 655
S.W.2d 489 (Ky. 1983); Buchanan v. Martin Marietta Corp., 494 A.2d 677 (Me.
1985); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980);
Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983); Weiner v. McGrawHill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982); Mera v. Dispatch
Printing Co., 19 Ohio St. 3d 100, 483 N.E.2d 150 (1985); Clanton v. Cain-Sloan
Co., 677 S.W.2d 441 (Tenn. 1984); Parker v. United Airlines, Inc., 32 Wash. App.
722, 649 P.2d 181 (1982).
6. See Savage v. Holiday Inn Corp., 603 F. Supp. 311 (D. Nev. 1985); Wynn
v. Boeing Military Airplane Co., 595 F. Supp. 727 (D. Kan. 1984); Cleary v. American
Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980); Magnan v. Anaconda
Indus., 193 Conn. 558, 479 A.2d 781 (1984); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co.,
373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977); Gates v. Life of Montana Ins. Co., 638 P.2d
1063 (Mont. 1982); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974);
Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984). See
generally 3 A. CoRBN, CONTRACTS § 541, at 97 (1960); 5 S. WILuSTON, Tim LAW
OF CONTRACTS § 670, at 159 (3d ed. 1961); Diamond, The Tort of Bad FaithBreach
of Contract: When, If At All, Should It Be Extended Beyond Insurance Transactions?, 64 MARQ. L. Rnv. 425 (1981); Lopatka, The Emerging Law of Wrongful
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The inequality of bargaining power between the employer and employee
motivated the growth of labor unions and collective bargaining agreements,7
which typically imposed requirements that dismissals be only for "just cause."
The changing attitude toward employee rights was similarly demonstrated by
the Supreme Court's deference to "freedom of contract" in Adair v. United
States' and Coppagev. Kansas.9 However, just several decades later the court
Discharge - A QuadrennialAssessment Of The Labor Law Issue Of The 80's, 40
Bus. LAw 1 (1984); Murg & Scharman, Employment at Will: Do The Exceptions
Overwhelm The Rule?, 23 B.C.L. RPv. 329 (1982); Note, Implied Contract Rights
To Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REv. 335 (1974); RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 205 (1981); Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The
Duty To Terminate Only In Good Faith, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1816 (1980).
7. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 320, 171 Cal. Rptr.
917, 926 (1981). See generally Peck, Unjust Dischargesfrom Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 Onto ST. L.J. 1 (1979).
8. 208 U.S. 161 (1908). In Adair, the Court held unconstitutional a federal

statute which imposed criminal liability upon common carriers engaged in interstate
commerce for unjustly discriminating against their employees because of memberships
in labor organizations. Id. at 180. Justice Harlan, writing for a divided Court, stated:
While ...the right of liberty and property guaranteed by the Constitution
against deprivation without due process of law is subject to such reasonable
restraints as the common good or the general welfare may require, it is not
within the functions of government - at least, in the absence of contract
between the parties - to compel any person in the course of his business
and Against his will, to accept or retain the personal services of another, or
to compel any person against his will, to perform personal services for
another. The right of a person to sell his labor upon such terms as he deems
proper is, in its essence, the same as the right of the purchaser of labor to
prescribe the conditions upon which he will accept such labor from the
person offering to sell it. So the right of the employee to quit the service
of the employer, for whatever reason, is the same as the right of the employer, for whatever reason, to dispense with the services of such employee. ... In all such particulars the employer and the employee have

equality of right, and any legislation that disturbs that equality is an arbitrary
interference with the liberty of contract which no government can legally
justify in a free land.
Id. at 174-75.
9. 236 U.S. 1 (1915). In Coppage, the Court struck down a Kansas statute
similar to that involved in Adair, which forbade contracts that required employees,
as a condition of employment, to agree not to join a union. Id. at 26. The Court
rejected the argument that inequality of bargaimmng power between employer and
employee should dictate modification of the freedom of contract ideology, stating:
[N]o doubt, wherever the right of private property exists, -there must and
will be inequalities of fortune; and thus it naturally happens that parties
negotiating about a contract are not equally unhampered by circumstances.
This applies to all contracts, and not merely to that between employer and
employee.

...

[I]t is from the nature of things impossible to uphold freedom of contract
and the right of private property without at the same time recognizing as
legitimate those inequalities of fortune that are the necessary result of the
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recognized that the disparity in negotiating strength between employers and
employees necessitated modification of formalistic contractual interpretation
and the need for labor organizations:
"[Labor unions] were organized out of the necessities of the situation; that
a single employee was helpless in dealing with an employer; that he was
dependent ordinarily on his daily wage for the maintenance of himself and
family; that if the employer refused to pay him the wages he thought fair,
he was nevertheless unable to leave the employ and resist arbitrary and unfair
treatment; that union was essential to give laborers opportunity to deal on
an equality with their employer.10
Congressional efforts to safeguard employees from abusive or discriminatory
firings resulted in an outpouring of legislation preventing discharge on the
basis of race," sex, 2 age, 3 physical handicap,' 4 and engaging in union activity. 15
exercise of those rights.
Id. at 17.
10. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937). The Court
upheld the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 provisions
safe-guarding the right of employees to self-organize and to select representatives for
collective bargaining. Id. at 33-34. Also, in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300
U.S. 379 (1937), the Court upheld a Washington minimum wage law for women as
not violative of constitutional due process.
The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract. It speaks of liberty
and prohibits the deprivation of liberty without due process of law. In
prohibiting that deprivation, the Constitution does not recognize an absolute
and uncontrollable liberty. Liberty in each of its phases has its history and
connotation. But the liberty safe-guarded is liberty in a social organization
which requires the protection of law against the evils which menace the
health, safety, morals, and welfare of the people.... This essential limitation of liberty in general governs freedom of contract in particular....
Parrish, 300 U.S. at 391-93.
11. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976).
12. Id.
13. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(a)(1)
(West 1985).
14. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West Supp. 1987).
15. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976). Also,
the Consumer Credit Protection Act prohibits discharge of employees whose wages
are garnished for indebtedness, IU.S.C.A. § 1674(a) (West 1982); the Bankruptcy
Code prohibits discriminatory treatment for filing for bankruptcy relief, 11 U.S.C.A.
§ 525 (West Supp. 1987); and a number of federal environmental statutes contain
whistleblower protection provisions, e.g., Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 §
312(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7622(a) (West 1983); Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9610 (West 1983); Resource
Conservation Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6971 (West 1983); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 2622 (West 1985); Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.A.
§ 1367 (West 1985); see also Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Perry v. Sinderman,
408 U.S. 593 (1972); Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C.A. § 7503 (West
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Despite the shift in sentiment toward heightened protection of job security for union and public sector employees, the historical policy which
favored unfettered managerial discretion over the workplace, reflective of
the laissez-faire attitude in the industrial revolution, still persists. The modifications of the at-will rule reflect a needed reformation in the balance of
rights for workers who individually lack the bargaining power to contract
for greater job security and are not otherwise protected by collective bargaining agreements. However, the judicially created exceptions to the common law at-will doctrine have been inconsistently applied and the standards
for analysis often muddled.
The thrust of this Article is twofold: to evaluate the policy considerations
and the substantive foundations underlying implied-in-fact contract rights
and the implied-in-law covenant and to provide a principled framework for
future analysis which will accommodate the respective interests of management and employees. Although the utility of at-will contracts is accepted, it
is proposed that employers not be permitted to eviscerate employee rights
through "disclaimers," and that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
should be construed to give employees remedial protection against bad faith
discharges.
B.

Implied Rights of Job Security: A Contextual Overview

Consider the hypothetical situation where two at-will employees work
for the same company. Employee A files a proper claim for workers' compensation benefits and employee B files a health insurance claim under the
employer's group policy. The employer subsequently discharges both employees in retaliation for filing the legitimate claims. At least one jurisdiction
recognizes different rights and remedies for these two similarly situated employees.16 Employee A may pursue a tort cause of action against the employer
for contravening the important public policy, embodied in the workers' compensation statutory scheme, that workers should be entitled to receive com1980); Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1140
(West 1985); Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C.A. § 660(c)
(West 1985); CoNm. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-51m (West Supp. 1983); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 26, §§ 831-839 (West Supp. 1983); MicH. Comp. LAws ANN. §§ 15.36115.369 (West 1981 & Supp. 1983); Chaturvedi, Legal ProtectionAvailable to Federal
Employees Against Wrongful Dismissal, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 287 (1968); Lowy, ConstitutionalLimitations on the Dismissal of Public Employees, 43 BROOKLYN L. REv.
1 (1976); Peck, Unjust DischargesFrom Employment: A Necessary Change in the
Law, 40 OmIo ST. L.J. 1 (1979).
16. Compare Price v. Carmack Datsun, Inc., 109 Ill. 2d 65, 485 N.E.2d 359
(1985) (no public policy violation where employee was discharged for filing health
insurance claim) with Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 IMI.2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1979)
(employer contravened public policy for terminating at-will employee in retaliation
for filing workmen's compensation claim).
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pensation for their job-related injuries. 17 In contrast, employee B may not
possess a tort claim because statutes governing the insurance industry are
aimed at the operations of insurance companies, and therefore would not
serve as the basis for an implied right of action for an employee against an
employer.' 8 Moreover, in some jurisdictions, employee B may not be entitled
to maintain a contract action for breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing because a strict interpretation of the at-will rule holds that the
employee may be fired even for "bad cause."
Tolerating such disparate and abusive treatment of at-will employees,
who lack the job security protections embodied in collective bargaining agreements or in statutes governing public sector employees, is insupportable both
in policy and in analysis. The at-will rule should be reformed to continue to
permit discharges of employees for either good cause or no cause, but limited
by an implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing which would
prevent "bad cause" firings. The proposed standard does not embrace the
extreme position which would jettison the at-will contract in favor of a "just
cause" requirement for dismissal, 19 nor the opposite extreme which would
17. Kelsey v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1979). The court
stated:
We are not convinced that an employer's otherwise absolute power to terminate an employee at will should prevail when that power is exercised to
prevent the employee from asserting his statutory rights under the Workmen's Compensation Act. As we have noted, the legislature enacted the
Workmen's Compensation Law as a comprehensive scheme to provide for
efficient and expeditious remedies for injured employees. This scheme would
be seriously undermined if employers were permitted to abuse their power
to terminate by threatening to discharge employees for seeking compensation
under the Act. We cannot ignore the fact that when faced with such a
dilemma many employees, whose common law rights have been supplanted
by the Act, would choose to retain their jobs, and thus, in effect, would be
left without a remedy either common law or statutory. This result, which
effectively relieves the employer of the responsibility expressly placed upon
him by the legislature, is untenable and is contrary to the public policy as
expressed in the Workmen's Compensation Act. We cannot believe that the
legislature, even in the absence of an explicit proscription against retaliatory
discharge, intended such a result.
Id. at 181-82, 384 N.E.2d at 357; see Smith v. Piezo Technology & Professional
Adm'rs, 427 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1983); Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind.
249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Firestone Textile Co. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730 (Ky.
1984); Ducote v. Jones Constr. Co., 471 So. 2d 704 (La. 1985); Hanson v. Harrah's,
100 Nev. 60, 675 P.2d 394 (1984); Ruiz v. Miller Curtain Co., 702 S.W.2d 183 (Tex.
1985). Contra Self v. Bennett, 474 So. 2d 673 (Ala. 1985); see also Johnson v.
Hussmann Corp., 610 F. Supp. 757 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (state law claim for retaliatory
discharge for pursuing workers' compensation claim preempted by federal labor law).
18. Price v. Carmack Datsun, Inc., 109 Ill. 2d 65, 69, 485 N.E.2d 359, 361
(1985).
19. See Peck, Unjust Dischargesfrom Employment: A Necessary Change in
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20
resist inroads or limitations on an employer's freedom to fire employees.
This change in the law would strike an important balance in employment
relationships because it would avoid the pitfalls of judicially rewriting contracts so as to become equivalent to collective bargaining agreements, yet it
would protect the legitimate expectations of at-will employees not to be
treated in bad faith. The covenant of good faith and fair dealing should be
implied by courts in all employment contracts as a matter of policy, and
therefore should be non-waivable by employees and non-disclaimable by employers.
The policy against bad faith termination should be viewed as embodying
both tort and contract duties and remedial principles. Although employer
conduct may in certain circumstances give rise to both contract and tort
causes of action, the two theories, as discussed in Part III of this Article,
are not co-extensive but have different policy underpinnings, substantive
requirements, and remedial consequences. The tort cause of action for violations of public policy should be narrowly focused to provide redress against
employer conduct which offends expressions of societal norms, typically embodied in statutory or constitutional law, but for which the statute does not
provide a remedy for the disenfranchised employee. In contrast, the implied
contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing should be concerned
principally with the relations of the employer and employee inter se.
In addition to tort duties, the definition of what constitutes a "bad
faith" discharge necessarily encompasses the protection of the basic contract
interests of expectancy, reliance and restitution. Bad faith in the employment
contract is chameleon-like in that it takes on meaning depending upon the
nature of the performance being rendered or to be rendered by the employee
qua employee.
For example, assume that an employee makes a large sale of computer
equipment for which her employer is obligated to pay her a commission.
Promptly after entry of the order, the employee is fired so that the employer
can avoid payment of the commission. Led by Massachusetts, courts have
recognized that the covenant of good faith should prevent the unjust enrichment of the employer in these circumstances and have required payment
of the commission based upon the employee's restitutionary interest. Although the restitution cases are the clearest to identify, they do not complete
the definition of a bad faith discharge.
The implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing must
also protect the at-will employee's expectancy and reliance interests. The
the Law, 40 Omo ST. L.J. 1, 4 (1979); Note, ProtectingAt Will Employees Against
Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARv. L. REv.
1816, 1940 (1980); Note, Employment At Will: Just Cause Protection Through Mandatory Arbitration, 62 WASH. L. REv. 151, 163-66 (1987).
20. See Gordon v. Matthew Bender & Co., 562 F. Supp. 1286 (N.D. Ill.
1983).
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immediate objection to this view, as voiced by some courts, is that an atwill employee has no expectation of continued employment and therefore the
reasons for discharge are irrelevant. 2' Certainly an at-will employee does not
have a legitimate expectation of being discharged only for "good cause" as
do public sector employees or those protected by a collective bargaining
agreement. Moreover, an at-will employee cannot properly assert an expectation for lifetime or permanent employment. It should be considered reasonable to hold that all employees have a legitimate expectation, which deserves
legal recognition and protection, of not being discharged for "bad cause."
Further support for recognition of an expectation interest of at-will
employees not to be discharged in bad faith may be borrowed by analogy
from the large body of case law defining bad faith in the insurance context.
In that regard, the "special relationship" between insurer and insured provides that a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
has occurred when the reasonable expectations of an insured are not satisfied.
At this juncture a word of caution is in order. A handful of courts,
principally in California, incorrectly have muddled the analysis of the expectancy interest involved in the implied-in-law good faith covenant with
implied-in-fact contract provisions concerning job security.Y This Article, in
Part III. B., discusses why the two implied contract limitations on the employment at-will rule are mutually exclusive. Also, Part II. reviews recent
developments which have limited the at-will doctrine through implied-in-fact
contract rights, as well as the principal defenses marshalled by employers
against attempts to curtail their broad prerogative to discharge at-will employees.
Consider again the earlier hypothetical about employees A and B who
were fired in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim and a health
insurance claim, respectively. Add the variable that the employer had distributed to all employees a policy manual which set forth internal grievance
and termination procedures and yet disclaimed any promise that the employee's status was other than at-will. Some courts have held that similar
promises by an employer of continued employment or to follow certain
procedures contained in handbooks or manuals are unenforceable because
the employee has not provided any independent consideration23 for the promise or because the provision lacks mutuality of obligation.2 4 Several reasons
exist for elimination of these defenses to implied-in-fact contract rights for
employees. A disclaimer that announced company procedures to be non21.

See, e.g., id.

22. See infra Part III. B. of text.
23. E.g., Jones v. East Center for Community Mental Health, 19 Ohio App.

3d 19, 23, 482 N.E.2d 969, 973 (1984).
24. See generally Pitcher v. United Oil & Gas Syndicate, 174 La. 66, 69, 139
So. 760, 761 (1932); Rape v. Mobile & O.R.R., 136 Miss. 38, 100 So. 585 (1924).
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binding on the employer should be viewed as inconsistent with the notion
that the employer may expect compliance with their terms by employees. As
discussed in Part II. D., the very term "disclaimer" is inartful in the at-will
employment context because it connotes the idea that otherwise existing substantive rights are unenforceable. In the at-will employment contract setting,
the disclaimer actually only limits which terms should be considered impliedin-fact into the contract. The employer should not have it both waysmandate that an employee's failure to follow procedures is a bar to any
recovery yet simultaneously claim that an employer's own failure to follow
its promised procedures is irrelevant because of the disclaimer.
II.

IMPLiED-IN-FACT CONTRACT RIGHTS

A.

Background

An increasing number of courts, perhaps anxious to circumscribe the
harsh operation of the at-will rule, have implied contract terms regarding
job security or fair treatment in disciplinary procedures from oral assurances
by employers or have extracted such terms from statements made in employee
policy manuals or personnel handbooks. 21 Since employment contracts often
are "informal, with brevity in working and much uncertainty in meaning," 26
this methodology of implied-in-fact contract provisions has been a Pandora's
box in at-will employment contracts.
The at-will employee by definition has no legally protectable contract
right either to continued employment or to being discharged only for "good
cause." 27 Rather, the employment relationship may be severed at any time
by either party, with or without cause.n In contrast, employment contracts
with a specified duration or collective bargaining agreements typically provide
heightened job security by restricting the grounds for discharge to good cause
or just cause. 29
The willingness of courts to find implied-in-fact contractual promises of
job security reflects a needed equitable adjustment of the relative bargaining
powers of employer and employee, enhancing the protections afforded employees in the private sector who are not covered by collective bargaining
25. E.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 598, 292
N.W.2d 880, 885 (1980); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 626

(Minn. 1983).
26. 3 A. ConnN, CoNmTAcTs § 684 (1960).
27. Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 223, 685 P.2d 1081,
1084 (1984).
28. Ryan v. J.C. Penney Co., 627 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1980).
29. See Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 320, 171 Cal.
Rptr. 917, 921 (1980).
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agreements. Inherent in making such determinations is the accommodation
and balancing of the respective interests of employer and employee in bringing fairness to the workplace.3 0 The balancing process, then, considers the
interests involved in freedom of contract and stability in labor relations
together with the dependency on job security for an employee's livelihood.31
Moreover, some courts properly have recognized that if employers receive
the benefits of better employee relations through, for example, the dissemination of policy manuals which provide assurances of job security, a substantial injustice would result if the employer treated the promises as illusory.3 2
Courts have increasingly recognized that the presumption that an employment
contract for indefinite duration was intended to be terminable at-will, like
any other presumption, may be rebutted by contrary evidence. 33 Even Martin
v. New York Life Insurance Co. y which adopted Wood's at-will formulation
in 1895, only accorded it the status of a rebuttable presumption. 35 Therefore,
30. In Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257
(1985), the court stated:
In recognizing a cause of action to provide a remedy for employees who
are wrongfully discharged, we must balance the interests of the employee,
the employer, and the public. Employees have an interest in knowing they
will not be discharged for exercising their legal rights. Employers have an
interest in knowing that they can run their businesses as they see fit as long
as their conduct is consistent with public policy. The public has an interest
in employment stability and in discouraging frivolous lawsuits by dissatisfied
employees.
Woolley, 99 N.J. at -,
491 A.2d at 1261 (quoting Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 71, 417 A.2d 505, 511 (1980)).
31. Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284,
, 491 A.2d 1257,
1261, 1266 (1985).
32. In Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d
880 (1980), the court stated:
While an employer need not establish personnel policies or practices, where
an employer chooses to establish such policies and practices and makes them
known to its employees, the employment relationship is presumably enhanced. The employer secures an orderly, cooperative and loyal work force,
and the employee the peace of mind associated with job security and the
conviction that he will be treated fairly.
Id. at 613, 292 N.W.2d at 892.
33. See, e.g., McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1111, 1119 (E.D. Pa.
1979); Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hosp., 141 Ariz. 544, -,
688 P.2d
170, 172-73 (1984); Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 324, 171 Cal.
Rptr. 917, 930 (1981); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 466-67, 443
N.E.2d 441, 446, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193, 198 (1982); see also Wagenseller v. Scottsdale
Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, -,
710 P.2d 1025, 1036, 1038 (1985) (the right
of discharge without cause as an implied contractual term in employment at-will
relationship, merely reiterates the English common law one year presumption); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY

34.
35.

§ 442 comment a (1986).

148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416 (1895).
Id. at 121, 42 N.E. at 417.
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the general rule which provides that an employment contract of indefinite
of construction
duration is terminable at-will should be characterized as a rule
36
rather than as a substantive limit on contract formation.
B.

The Objections: Mutuality and Consideration

Several difficult and controversial issues are involved in whether handbook provisions relating to job security, i.e., that an employee would be
discharged only for "good cause," are contractually binding and enforceable.
Employers have presented a number of objections to any modification of
the at-will relationship through implied-in-fact contract terms extracted from
policy manuals or personnel handbooks. The principal employer defense is
that the at-will contract is not modified in instances where the employee has
failed to provide "independent consideration," other than the services al-37
ready agreed upon, in exchange for implied-in-fact promises of job security.
Secondly, employees have contended that such implied-in-fact terms are not
contractually binding based upon the doctrine of mutuality of obligation. 8
1. Independent Consideration
The most troublesome issue with respect to the enforceability of job
security provisions in an at-will employment relationship has two facets:
whether an employee must supply some consideration other than his continued work for his employer, and, if so, what satisfies that independent consideration requirement. Some courts have held that policy manual provisions
regarding job security should be treated like individual long-term employment
36. See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 598, 292
N.W.2d 880, 885 (1980); Woolley v. Hoffman La-Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, -,
491 A.2d 1257, 1263 (1985). The court in Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333
N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983) stated:

It should not be necessary for an employee to prove a contract is of "permanent" employment or for a specified term in order to avoid summary

dismissal if the parties have agreed otherwise. There is no reason why the
at-will presumption needs to be construed as a limit on the parties' freedom

to contract. If the parties choose to provide in their employment contract
of an indefinite duration for provisions of job security, they should be able

to do so.
Id. at 628; see also Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hosp., 141 Ariz. 544,
688 P.2d 170, 173 (1984); Eklund v. Vincent Brass & Aluminum Co., 351 N.W.2d

371, 376 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
37. See Gordon v. Matthew Bender & Co., 526 F. Supp. 1286 (N.D. Ill.
1983); Gates v. Life of Montana Ins. Co., 638 P.2d 1063 (Mont. 1982); Roberts v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Wash. 2d 887, 568 P.2d 764 (1977).
38. See Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 551 P.2d 779
(1976); Campbell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 413 N.E.2d 1054 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
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contracts which, to be contractually enforceable, must be supported by consideration other than the services to be performed by the employee. 9 In that
regard, one court explained:
The additional consideration rule usually does not offer relief from the atwill presumption to the typical, lower echelon employee who brings nothing
beyond his skills to the employment. Nor does it offer relief to the typical
white collar professional such as appellant. However, we do not believe the
rule to be inherently "unfair" any more than other facets of the law of
contracts which, generally, does not realter the economic positions from
which parties bargain. All manner of contracts are formed between parties
of unequal bargaining strength. The law of contracts has traditionally acted
as umpire to contractual disputes-that is, it does not reassign the players
to even-out the teams, but insures that the game is played fairly, regardless
of the disparity of bargaining power. 0
An increasing number of courts, though, have enforced job security provisions without requiring additional consideration, 41 based upon the Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 80 Comment a 42 that a single performance
may furnish consideration for multiple promises, and upon the general contract principle that courts should not inquire into the adequacy of consid39. E.g., Ryan v. J.C. Penney Co.,'627 F.2d 836, 838 (7th Cir. 1980) (applying
Indiana law); Gordon v. Matthew Bender & Co., 526 F. Supp. 1286, 1295 (N.D. Ill.
1983); Gates v. Life of Montana Ins. Co., 638 P.2d 1063, 1066 (Mont. 1982).
40. Darlington v. General EIec., 350 Pa. Super. 183, -,
504 A.2d 306, 315
(1986). In Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441,457 N.Y.S.2d
193 (1982), the court stated that "the detriment suffered or the thing promised need
be of no benefit to the one who agreed to it." Id. at 464, 443 N.E.2d at 445, 457
N.Y.S.2d at 197. However, in Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Wash. 2d 887,
894-95, 568 P.2d 764, 769 (1977), the court took a very restrictive approach and
stated that the consideration must involve a detriment to the employee and a benefit
to the employer.
41. E.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 325, 171 Cal.
Rptr. 917, 924 (1980); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629 (Minn.
1983); Southwest Gas Corp. v. Ahmad, 99 Nev. 594, 595, 668 P.2d 261, 261 (1983);
Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, -,
491 A.2d 1257, 1267 (1985);
Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 465, 443 N.E.2d 441, 445, 457 N.Y.S.2d
193, 197 (1982); Helle v. Landmark, Inc., 15 Ohio App. 3d 1, 11, 472 N.E.2d 765,
775 (1984).
42. According to Comment a:
Since consideration is not required to be adequate in value (See § 79), two
or more promises may be binding even though made for the price of one.
A single performance or return promise may thus furnish consideration for
any number of promises. But if the performance or return promise would
not be consideration for a single promise, it is not consideration for that
promise as part of a set of promises, or for the other promises in the set.
REsTAmENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRAcTs

§ 80 comment a (1981).
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eration. 43 Therefore, the fact that an employee stays on the job should be
interpreted as providing sufficient consideration to support several promises
by the employer. In Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 44 a leading California state
court decision which addressed implied contract rights for at-will employees,
the court speculated that the most likely explanation for the independent
consideration requirement was that it served an evidentiary function. 4 Accordingly, the additional consideration requirement should be viewed as a
rule of construction rather than a substantive limitation on contract formation. 46 As one court explained:
The term "consideration" is not used here as it is in the usual contractual
context to signify a validation device. The term is used, rather, more as an
interpretationdevice. When "sufficient additional consideration" is present,
courts infer that the parties intended that the contract will not be terminable
at-will. This inference may be nothing more than a legal fiction because it
is possible that in a given case, the parties never truly contemplated how
long the employment would last even though additional consideration is
present.47
43. REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF CONTRACTS § 79 (1979); see Stauter v. Walnut
Grove Prods., 188 N.W.2d 305, 311 (Iowa 1971); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 600, 292 N.W.2d 880, 885 (1980). One scholar has stated:
If an executed consideration is given by the promisee, a promise of employment on stated terms is not rendered unenforceable by the fact that the
employment is to continue permanently, or for an indefinite period or as
long as the employee wishes to stay. The employee is not bound; but the
employer is bound. There is no mutuality of obligation; but there was other
sufficient consideration.
1A. A. CoRiN, CONTRACTS § 152, at 14 n.11.15 (1963).
44. 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1980).
45. The court stated that "it is more probable that the parties intended a
continuing relationship, with limitations upon the employer's dismissal authority,
when the employee has provided some benefit to the employer, or suffers some
detriment, beyond the usual rendition of service." Id. at 326, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 925.
46. See Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hosp., 141 Ariz. 544, -, 688
P.2d 170, 172 (1984) (en banc); Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311,
326, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 925 (1980); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408
Mich. 579, 600, 292 N.W.2d 880, 885 (1980); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333
N.W.2d 622, 629 (Minn. 1983); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 46667, 443 N.E.2d 441, 446, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193, 198 (1982); RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF
AGENCY § 442 (1971).
47. Darlington v. General Elec., 350 Pa. Super. 183, -, 504 A.2d 306,
314 (1986) (emphasis in original). The court further explained:
Even so, the at-will presumption would be overcome. On the other hand,
if the parties specifically agreed that the employment would be at-will, even
though additional consideration were present, we would expect a court to
construe the contract according to the parties' stated intention and hold it
to be at-will. Thus, we start with the usual at-will presumption which, let
us say, has not been overcome by evidence of a contract for a term or for
a reasonable length of time. Then, if sufficient additional consideration is
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For those courts that still require independent consideration to render an
employer's promise of job security binding, however, a complex derivative
issue has been determining the nature of the conduct by an employee which
may be characterized as "additional" consideration. The services for which
the employee was hired obviously constitute the initial consideration for
contract formation.
It is a highly artificial and dubious analysis, however, to distinguish
between the consideration necessary for formation of an employment contract
and "additional" consideration, apart from the services to be performed, as
a requirement for an employment contract which may not be terminable atwill. This problematic dichotomy requires courts to engage in fine line-drawing as to whether or not, for example, longevity of service, 48 foregoing other
employment opportunities, 49 or relocating to take the new position 0 would
satisfy the additional consideration test. As a result, the court decisions will
continue to reach inconsistent and unpredictable results. Therefore, the better
approach would be to eliminate the independent consideration requirement
as a basis for a "just cause" standard for discharge, and to limit its application to a rule of construction to ascertain the intentions of the parties
concerning job security.
2.

Mutuality of Obligation

In addition to the issue regarding the independent consideration requirement, courts have disagreed as to whether job security provisions in employee
present, the law presumes this to be sufficient to rebut the at-will presumption. Such a contract could not be rightfully terminated at-will but would
continue for a reasonable length of time. 56 C.J.S. Master and Servant §
31. However, the presumption created by the additional consideration rule
could itself be rebutted by evidence that the parties specifically contracted
for employment at-will.
Id. at -,
504 A.2d at 314 (emphasis in original).
48. See Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Wash. 2d 887, 895, 568 P.2d
764, 769 (1977) (en banc). Contra Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d
311, 327, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 925 (1981); see also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.
593, 601-03 (1972).
49. See Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Wash. 2d 887, 895-96, 568 P.2d
764, 769 (1977) (en banc). Contra McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1111, 1119
(E.D. Pa. 1979); Eklund v. Vincent Brass & Aluminum Co., 351 N.W.2d 371, 377
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 465, 443 N.E.2d
441, 445, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193, 197 (1982); see also Helle v. Landmark, Inc., 15 Ohio
App. 3d 1, 10-11, 472 N.E.2d 765, 775 (1984) (whether employee actually considered
other opportunities for employment was irrelevant).
50. See Foley v. Community Oil Co., 64 F.R.D. 561, 563 (D.N.H. 1974);
Murphree v. Alabama Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 449 So. 2d 1218, 1221 (Ala. 1984).
Contra Griffith v. Sollay Found. Drilling, Inc., 373 So. 2d 979, 982 (La. Ct. App.
1979).
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manuals should be unenforceable on grounds of lacking "mutuality of obligation." The doctrine of mutuality of obligation in essence provides that
neither party to a contract will be bound unless both parties are bound.5 1 A
steadily dwindling number of courts which have followed the mutuality theory have held that in an employment contract for an indefinite term, the atwill employee has made no binding promise to continue working; therefore,
the employer correspondingly has unfettered discretion to terminate the em52
ployment relationship.
Mutuality of obligation, however, has been expressly rejected by the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 53 and should not be considered as an
essential element to a binding contract.5 4 In Cleary v. American Airlines,
Inc.," for example, the court attempted to circumscribe the mutuality of
obligation underpinnings to the at-will rule in California by reasoning:
The absolute power conferred by Labor Code section 2922 on an employer to discharge the at-will employee without cause is founded on the
contractual concept of mutuality of obligation. The reasoning is that, since
an employee may terminate the employment relationship when he wishes to
do so, the employer is entitled to terminate the relationship at his pleasure.
However, when viewed in the context of present-day economic reality and
the joint, reasonable expectations of employers and their employees, the
"freedom" bestowed by the rule of law on the employee may indeed be
fictional. As the case law interpreting Labor Code section 2922 demonstrates,
the rule applied in its purest form easily leads to harsh results for the
employee.6

Rather than evaluating the enforceability of the employment contract in terms
of mutuality, the better reasoned view should be to inquire whether or not7
consideration is present when the at-will employment contract is formed.

51. Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629 (Minn. 1983);
Helle v. Landmark, Inc., 15 Ohio App. 3d 1, 12, 472 N.E.2d 765, 776 (1984).
52. See Campbell v. Eli Libby & Co., 413 N.E.2d 1054, 1062 (Ind. Ct. App.
1980); Hanson v. Central Show Printing Co., 256 Iowa 1221, 1228, 130 N.W.2d 654,
658 (1964).
53. Section 79 of the Restatement rejects mutuality of obligation by providing:
"If the requirement of consideration is met, there is no additional requirement of a)
a gain, advantage, or benefit to the promisor or a loss, disadvantage, or detriment
to the promisee; or b) equivalence in the values exchanged; or c) 'mutuality of
obligation."' RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 (1981).
54. Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629 (Minn. 1983);
Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 465, 443 N.E.2d 441, 445, 457 N.Y.S.2d
193, 197 (1982).
55. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
56. Id. at 448-49, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
57.

1 A. CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 152, at 4-6, 14-16 (1960) states:

Mutuality of obligation should be used solely to express the idea that each
party is under a legal duty to the other; each has made a promise and each
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Moreover, some courts have recognized that mutuality of obligation should
apply, if at all, to an analysis of bilateral contracts where reciprocal promises
are exchanged, and that the mutuality limitation does not make sense in the
employment relationship involving a unilateral contract formulation."8
C.

UnilateralContract Analysis

The most logical and internally consistent methodology for determining
what particular promises of job security by an employer modify the emis an obligor ....
In order to save the supposed requirement of "mutuality,"
it is sometimes declared that it means nothing more than that there must
be a sufficient consideration. Even though one of the parties has made no
promise and is bound by no duty, the contract has sufficient mutuality if
he has given an executed consideration ....
Courts now often say correctly
that it is consideration that is necessary, not mutuality of obligation....
There are, indeed, cases holding otherwise, in the belief that "both parties
must be bound or neither one is bound," that for a valid contract there
must be "mutuality of obligation" (or something called "mutuality"), and
that if a contract is terminable "at will" by one party it is necessarily
terminable "at will" by the other party also. These decisions can be found
in considerable number; but the decisions to the contrary are far better
considered, both in justice and in theory. This is not the first or only case
in which juristic opinion has been confused and conflicting and in which
substantial uniformity must be reached by trial and error.
Id.; see Ryan v. J.C. Penney Co., 627 E.2d 836, 838 (7th Cir. 1980); Eales v. Tanana
Valley Medical-Surgical Group, Inc., 663 P.2d 958, 959 (Alaska 1983); Toussaint v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 600, 292 N.W.2d 880, 885 (1980); Eklund
v. Vincent Brass & Aluminum Co., 351 N.W.2d 371, 375 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984);
Helle v. Landmark, Inc., 15 Ohio App. 3d 1, 12, 472 N.E.2d 765, 776 (1984); see
also Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629 (Minn. 1983) (mutuality
of obligation characterized as "simply a species of the forbidden inquiry into the
adequacy of consideration").
58, E.g., Eales v. Tanana Valley Medical-Surgical Group, Inc., 663 P.2d 958,
958 (Alaska 1983); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 465, 443 N.E.2d
441, 445, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193, 197 (1982); Helle v. Landmark, Inc., 15 Ohio App. 3d
1, 12, 472 N.E.2d 765, 776 (1984). The Eales court, quoting Corbin, stated:
[I]f the employer made a promise, either express or implied, not only to
pay for the service but also that the employment should continue for a
period of time that is either definite or capable of being determined, that
employment is not terminable by him "at will" after the employee has begun
or rendered some of the requested service or has given any other consideration (or has acted in reliance on the promise in such manner as to make
applicable the rule in Restatement, Contracts, § 90). This is true even though
the employee has made no return promise and has retained the power and
legal privilege of terminating the employment "at will." The employer's
promise is supported by the service that has been begun or rendered or by
the other executed consideration or action in reliance. There is a valid unilateral contract; there is an obligation although there is no "mutuality of
obligation."
Eales, 663 P.2d at 960 (quoting IA A. CoanN, CONmACTS § 152, at 14 (1963)).
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ployment at-will relationship is to characterize such promises as a unilateral
contract formed through the traditional requisites of offer, acceptance and
consideration. 9 Whether any particular promise of employment on certain
terms may properly be characterized as an offer should be determined by
the objective manifestations of the parties rather than by an employee's
subjective understanding as to employmentA° An employer's general state6
ments of policy would not meet the contractual requirements for an offer. '
An employee accepts the offer and supplies the necessary consideration by
62
continuing to stay on the job after the employer has made the promises. 63
a,
comment
80
section
This approach follows the Restatement of Contracts
4
that a single performance may furnish consideration for multiple promises .
The language contained in a particular employee handbook and the
employer's course of conduct and representations regarding it should constitute the principal evidence relevant to whether the employment at-will
relationship has been modified by the handbook provisions becoming implied-in-fact enforceable contractual promises. 65 Courts have considered a
wide variety of factors to ascertain the terms of an implied employment
contract, including the intent and expectations of the parties," business cus59. See Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 626 (Minn. 1983);
Brookshaw v. South St. Paul Feed, Inc., 381 N.W.2d 33, 36 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986);
491 A.2d 1257, 1267 (1985);
Woolley v. Hoffman-La Rouche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, -,
Helle v. Landmark, Inc., 15 Ohio App. 3d 1, 8, 472 N.E.2d 765, 773 (1984); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 228-29, 685 P.2d 1081, 1087 (1984)
(en banc).
60. See, e.g., Allegri v. Providence-St. Margaret Health Center, 9 Kan. App.
684 P.2d 1031, 1036 (1984); Sepanske v. Bendix Corp., 147 Mich.
2d 659, -,
App. 819, 827, 384 N.W.2d 54, 58 (1985); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333
N.W.2d 622, 626 (Minn. 1983); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d
219, 224, 685 P.2d 1081, 1085 (1984); Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Wash.
2d 887, 894, 568 P.2d 764, 769 (1977) (en banc); Parker v. United Airlines, Inc., 32
Wash. App. 722, 725, 649 P.2d 181, 183 (1982); see also Helle v. Landmark, Inc.,
15 Ohio App. 3d 1, 8-9, 472 N.E.2d 765, 773-74 (1984) (court followed RESTATEmENT
(SEcOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 (1979) in holding that oral representations of severance
pay made by the employer's agents constituted promissory representations or offers
sufficient to bind the employer).
61. Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 626 (Minn. 1983);
Helle v. Landmark, Inc., 15 Ohio App. 3d 1, 9, 472 N.E.2d 765, 773 (1984).
62. Pine River, 333 N.W.2d at 627; Helle, 15 Ohio App. 3d at 11, 472 N.E.2d
at 775.
63. See supra note 42.
64. See Pine River, 333 N.W.2d at 627; Helle, 15 Ohio App. 3d at 11, 472
N.E.2d at 775.
, 688 P.2d
65. Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hosp., 141 Ariz. 544,
170, 174 (1984).
66. Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Wash. 2d 887, 894, 568 P.2d 764,
769 (1977); see also Wiskotoni v. Michigan National Bank-West, 716 F.2d 378, 386
(6th Cir. 1983); Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, -, 710
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67
tom and usage, the nature of the employment, 6 assurances of continued
employment by the employer, 69 longevity of service,70 satisfactory performance evaluations received by the employee,71 and whether the employee has
left another job in alleged reliance upon job security assurances given by the
new employer.7 2
Courts have split on whether an employee must prove his reliance on
company policies and procedures in order to have them incorporated into
his employment contract. Reliance should be presumed equally for all employees in order to prevent the fortuity of discovery of terms in an employee
handbook from becoming controlling. Also, the employee would be placed
in an evidentiary dilemma of proving his reliance on the assurances of job
security.
For example, in Corbin v. Sinclair Marketing, Inc.,73 the court stated
that employee handbooks or policy manuals containing specific procedures
P.2d 1025, 1037 (1985); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 599,
292 N.W.2d 880, 885 (1980); Arie v. Intertherm, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 142, 153-54 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1983); Forrester v. Parker, 93 N.M. 781, 782, 606 P.2d 191, 192 (1980);
Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, -, 491 A.2d 1257, 1264-65
(1985); Helle v. Landmark, Inc., 15 Ohio App. 3d 1, 7-9, 472 N.E.2d 765, 772-73
(1984); Parker v. United Airlines, Inc., 32 Wash. App. 722, 725, 649 P.2d 181, 183
(1982); Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702, 707 (Wyo. 1985). But
see Muller v. Stromberg Carlson Corp., 427 So. 2d 266, 268 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983) (expectations held insufficient to create a binding term of employment).
67. Wiskotoni v. Michigan National Bank-West, 716 F.2d 378, 386 (6th Cir.
1983); Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 327, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917,
926 (1981); Eklund v. Vincent Brass & Aluminum Co., 351 N.W.2d 371, 376 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1984); Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Wash. 2d 887, 894, 568 P.2d
764, 769 (1977); Parker v. United Airlines, Inc., 32 Wash. App. 722, 725, 649 P.2d
181, 183 (1982).
68. Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Wash. 2d 887, 894, 568 P.2d 764,
769 (1977); Parker v. United Airlines, Inc., 32 Wash. App. 722, 725, 649 P.2d 181,
183 (1982).
69. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 327, 171 Cal. Rptr.
917, 933 (1981); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 613, 292
N.W.2d 880, 892 (1980); Rowe v. Noren Pattern & Foundry Co., 91 Mich. App.
254, 259-60, 283 N.W.2d 713, 716-17 (1979); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d
458, 465, 443 N.E.2d 441, 445, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193, 197 (1982).
70. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 328, 171 Cal. Rptr.
917, 926 (1981); Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 456, 168
Cal. Rptr. 722, 729 (1980); Allegri v. Providence-St. Margaret Health Center, 9 Kan.
App. 2d 659,

-,

684 P.2d 1031, 1036 (1984).

71. Kistler v. Life Care Centers of America, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 1268, 1270
(D. Kan. 1985); Ailegri v. Providence-St. Margaret Health Center, 9 Kan. App. 2d
659, -,
684 P.2d 1031, 1036 (1984). Contra Gordon v. Matthew Bender & Co.,
562 F. Supp. 1286, 1291 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
72. Ailegri v. Providence-St. Margaret Health Center, 9 Kan. App. 2d 659,
684 P.2d 1031, 1036 (1984); Rowe v. Noren Pattern & Foundry Co., 91 Mich.
App. 254, 263, 283 N.W.2d 713, 718 (1979).
73. 684 P.2d 265 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984).
-,
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for termination of employment would give rise to a contractual duty on the
part of the employer to comply with the procedures only if relied upon by
74
the employee and supported by the consideration of continued service. In
75
Southwest Gas Corp. v. Ahmad, the court considered evidence that the
employee had knowledge of the termination provisions of a handbook as
supportive of an inference that the handbook constituted part of their employment contract.7 6 Conversely, in Wagenseller v. ScottsdaleMemorial Hospital,77 the court stated that an employee's reliance on a personnel manual
provision was just one of several factors, including the language of the
provision, the employer's course of conduct, and oral representations regarding the policy that were relevant in determining 7whether the parties
intended to modify an employment at-will relationship.
In Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 79 the court held that when an

employer issues a policy manual with specific promises of job security and
fair treatment, employees may justifiably rely on those representations as
enforceable provisions of the employment contract:
It would appear that employers expect, if not demand, that their employees
abide by the policies expressed in such manuals. This may create an atmosphere where employees justifiably rely on the expressed policies and,
thus, justifiably expect that the employers will do the same. Once an employer announces a specific policy or practice, especially in light of the fact
that he expects employees to abide by the same, the employer may not treat
its promises as illusory.10
74. Id. at 267.
75. 99 Nev. 594, 668 P.2d 261 (1983).
76. Id. Also, in Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 627 (Minn.
1983), the court stated that: "In the case of unilateral contracts for employment,
where an at-will employee retains employment with knowledge of new or changed
conditions, the new or changed conditions may become a contractual obligation."
77. 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025 (1985).
78. Id. at -, 710 P.2d at 1038.
79. 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984).
80. Id. at 230, 685 P.2d at 1088. The court further stated:
Therefore, we hold that if an employer, for whatever reason, creates an
atmosphere of job security and fair treatment with promises of specific
treatment in specific situations and an employee is induced thereby to remain
on the job and not actively seek other employment, those promises are
enforceable components of the employment relationship. We believe that by
his or her unilateral objective manifestation of intent, the employer creates
an expectation, and thus an obligation of treatment in accord with those
written promises. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 (1981)
(promise is a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a
specified way, so made as to justify a promise in understanding a commitment has been made).
Id.
The court in Thompson also cited the Michigan Supreme Court in Toussaint
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Finally, in Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc.,' the court took the position
that reliance by an employee on an employer's personnel policies would be
presumed in order to protect the fights of all employees.8 2 The court explained
that presuming reliance would make the personnel policies with respect to
job security binding on the employer at the time the manual is distributed.
Thus, employees hired before or after dissemination of the policies would
equally benefit, irrespective of their reliance on the policies, just as union
members benefit from collective-bargaining agreements regardless of their
individual degree of reliance on its terms. 3 The treatment of the reliance
issue by the court in Woolley makes the most sense from a pragmatic standpoint. Reliance should be presumed equally for at-will employees; otherwise,
employees will have different levels of job security based upon the same
"promises" by an employer.
Just as courts have split over the enforceability of employer policies
depending on an employee's reliance, courts also have disagreed as to the
timing of when a policy becomes binding and whether it applies to employees
retroactively. Several courts have held that policy manuals distributed to
employees after they were hired did not constitute a part of the employment
contract. 4 These courts have reasoned that the manuals merely reflect a
unilateral expression of company policies and procedures, the terms were not
bargained for, and no meeting of the minds existed. 5 Moreover, the prov. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 613, 292 N.W.2d 880, 894 (1980), for
the proposition that an employer distributing a personnel manual to employees creates
an expectation of compliance, or an "instinct with an obligation." Thus, some measure of reliance on the policies by employees seems apparently required in order to
render the promises enforceable. However, the court in Toussaint specifically stated
that it was unnecessary for the employee even to demonstrate knowledge of the
policies, and ipso facto did not require reliance. Toussaint, 408 Mich. at 613, 292
N.W.2d at 892.
81. 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257 (1985).
82. Id. at 295, 491 A.2d at 1268. The court in Woolley stated:
If reliance is not presumed, a strict contractual analysis might protect the
rights of some employees and not others. For example, where an employee
is not even aware of the existence of the manual, his or her continued work
would not ordinarily be thought of as the bargained-for detriment. Similarly,
if it is quite clear that those employees who knew of the offer knew that it
sought their continued work, but nevertheless continued without the slightest
intention of putting forth that action as consideration for the employer's
promise, it might not be sufficient to form a contract.
Id. at 295 n.10, 491 A.2d at 1268 n.10 (citations omitted).
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., Heideck v. Kent General Hosp., 446 A.2d 1095, 1097 (Del.
1982); Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 55, 551 P.2d 779, 782
(1976); Gates v. Life of Montana Ins. Co., 196 Mont. 178, 183, 638 P.2d 1063, 1066
(1982).
85. See NationalBeef Packing Co., 220 Kan. at 55, 551 P.2d at 782; Gates,
196 Mont. at 183, 638 P.2d at 1066.
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visions could not amount to a modification of the initial employment contract
because the employee supplied no new and independent consideration for its
86
terms.
A better reasoned view is that personnel handbooks issued after em87
ployment begins may nevertheless become part of an employment contract.
The emphasis in decisions adopting such a view is not the fortuity of whether
a policy is distributed before or after a particular employee is hired, but
rather that the employer expects all employees to abide by the circulated
policies and thus has created an expectation on behalf of employees that the
terms are applicable."
The language contained in an employee handbook or manual must be
evaluated as to its contractual significance in light of the objective purpose
intended by the employer. If the employer intended the provisions to serve
merely as guidelines to inform employees of normative conduct, then courts
should be disinclined to translate the provisions into enforceable contract
rights. On the other hand, if the statements objectively may be viewed as
requiring certain employee actions, then the terms begin to sound like contractual promises. Courts may be guided by some of the following factors
in making that determination: the specificity of the language, the present or
future tense of conduct described, the extent of distribution and attention
called to the manual, words which prohibit or mandate actions, and any
remedial consequences identified. As an illustration, assume that an employer
distributes an employee handbook to all employees/ s part of the initial
acclimation process and stresses that employees are r,sponsible to read, keep
possession of, and insert updates into the manual.'Further assume that the
manual contained a section entitled "Grievance and Termination Procedures" which outlines a six stage procedure for/handling complaints or discharges concerning employees. If an employer' failed to follow the stated
procedures, it would be anomalous to contend that the provisions objectively
lacked significance as implied-in-fact contractual terms. Such an approach is
supported by the widely accepted proposition that any ambiguity in terms
should be construed against the employer as the party who caused the uncertainty. 89
D. Disclaimers
A number of courts which have found that implied promises of job
security or procedural safeguards conthined in an employee manual may be
86. See NationalBeef Packing Co., 220 Kan. at 55, 551 P.2d at 782; Gates,
196 Mont. at 183, 638 P.2d at 1066.
87. See Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 627 (Minn. 1985);

Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702, 704-06 (Wyo. 1985).

88. E.g., Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 230, 685 P.2d
1081, 1088 (1984).
89. Cavalier County Memorial Hosp. v. Kartes, 343 N.W.2d 781, 784 (N.D.
1984).
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enforceable against an employer, even when employment is for an indefinite
term and would otherwise be at-will, have provided employers an escape
hatch through the use of disclaimers.9 In essence, these courts have held that
when an employer does not issue a personnel manual at all, or distributes
one with language of limitation, then expectations of performance are not
created and employees have no justifiable reason to rely on representations
in the manual. 91
Although the case law interpreting the effectiveness of disclaimers in the
implied-in-fact employment contract setting has been fairly minimal, it has
spawned a number of troublesome issues. As a threshold matter, a large part
of the confusion may stem from the term "disclaimer" itself. The concept
of disclaiming something necessarily suggests that certain substantive rights
which otherwise would belong to one party are either limited or erased as a
result of the disclaimer. The source of those rights could be contractual or
statutory, such as may be found in the U.C.C. provisions regarding -warranties for the sale of goods.92 However, in the context of the at-will employment
contract, calling such limiting language a disclaimer is a misnomer and inartful because the provision does not modify or extinguish existing rights
otherwise possessed by an at-will employee. Rather, the "disclaimer" functions to temper statements concerning such topics as job security or the
observance of certain procedures by an employer so that such statements do
not become promises implied into the employment contract.
The importance of the distinction between extinguishing existing rights
and preventing such rights from arising in the first place is illustrated by the
problems resulting from the inexact usage of the term "disclaimer." For
instance, the following application problems may arise when an employer
attempts to erase a previously enunciated promise through the use of a deftly
phrased disclaimer: determining to what extent the disclaimer must be "conspicuous," deciding whether other oral or written representations may negate
its effect, ascertaining the extent of a particular employee's reliance on the
terms of the promise, and determining whether the disclaimer is valid if it
is made after the distribution of a manual containing promises of job security.
The courts which have accepted the effectiveness of disclaimers in implied-in-fact contracts of employment premise their analysis on the idea that
90. See, e.g., Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hosp., 141 Ariz. 544, -,
688 P.2d 170, 174 (1984); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579,

618-19, 292 N.W.2d 880, 894-95 (1980); Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche; Inc., 99
N.J. 284, -, 491 A.2d 1257, 1271 (1985); Helle v. Landmark, Inc., 15 Ohio App.
3d 1, 10, 472 N.E.2d 765, 774-75 (1984); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102
Wash. 2d 219, 230-31, 685 P.2d 1081, 1088 (1984).
91. See Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hosp., 141 Ariz. 544,
P.2d 170, 174 (1984).

-,

688

92. See U.C.C. §§ 2-313 to 2-316.
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the at-will employee has no expectation of job security and therefore cannot
justifiably rely on the policies and procedures stated. 93 Courts have not articulated a clear standard, however, as to the nature and extent to which
employees must demonstrate knowledge of or reliance on the employer's
policies. Indeed, a leading Michigan case, Touissant v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield,94 advanced inconsistent arguments in support of finding an impliedin-fact contract modification. The court reached its result based on the expectation of performance created by the employer's distribution of a handbook containing certain job security provisions, implying some requisite
awareness or knowledge of those provisions by employees. On the other hand,
the court took the additional position that employer statements of policy can
give rise to contractual rights in employees even if the employees know
nothing of the policies, or that the employer can change them unilaterally
and without notice.9 5 If reliance is demanded by a court, then the employee's
knowledge of the policies becomes essential and the language, location and
conspicuousness of disclaiming statements becomes significant. If reliance is
presumed, however, or eliminated altogether as a requisite for contractual
analysis, then disclaimers are irrelevant.
Similarly, in Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc.,96 the court indicated
that if an employer does not want a policy manual to be construed as a
binding contract, then it must simply include a statement in the manual that
no promises are being made. 97 The court failed to reconcile that position,
however, with its statements that reliance by employees was to be presumed
under the circumstances.98
Several courts have indicated that a disclaimer of promises of job security
must be "conspicuous" 99 or in a "very prominent position"'10 without explaining what satisfies that requirement. Section 2-316(2) of the U.C.C.,
which requires that disclaimers of implied warranties in the sale of goods
93. See Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hosp., 141 Ariz. 544, -, 688
P.2d 170, 174 (1984); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 619,
292 N.W.2d 880, 894-95 (1980); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d
219, 230-31, 685 P.2d 1081, 1088 (1984).
94. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
95. Id. at 614-15, 292 N.W.2d at 892.
96. 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257 (1985).
97. Id. at 298, 491 A.2d at 1271.
98. Id. at 293, 491 A.2d at 1268. Indeed, the court acknowledged that, "If
reliance is not presumed, a strict contractual analysis might protect the rights of some
employees and not others. For example, where an employee is not even aware of the
existence of the manual, his or her continued work would not ordinarily be thought
of as the bargained-for detriment." Id. at -, 491 A.2d at 1268 n.10.
99. E.g., Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 230-31, 685
P.2d 1081, 1088 (1984).
491 A.2d
100. E.g., Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche Inc., 99 N.J. 284, -,
1257, 1271 (1985).
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must be conspicuous, 1° 1 may provide guidance as to the interpretation problems presented by disclaimers in employment manuals. Section 1-201(10)
defines "conspicuous" as follows:
A term or clause is conspicuous when it is so written that a reasonable
person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it. A printed
heading in capitals (as: NON-NEGOTIABLE BILL OF LADING) is conspicuous. Language in the body of a form is "conspicuous" if it is in larger
or other contrasting type of color. But in a telegram any stated term is
"conspicuous." Whether a term or clause is "conspicuous" or not is for
decision by the court.
Comment 10 to section 1-201(10) states that the test of "conspicuous" is
"whether attention can reasonably be expected to be called to it." This
attention-calling litmus test has resulted in varied interpretations by courts,
including focusing on the capitalization, typeface, bargaining position of the
parties, and location of the disclaimerc2 It is a non sequitur, though, for a
court to hold that a contract of employment may be modified by an employer's distribution of a policy manual irrespective of knowledge or reliance
by employees, while holding that a disclaimer eviscerating those same promises would be effective if "conspicuous."
In addition to determining whether a particular disclaimer statement in
an employee handbook is "conspicuous," a potential problem exists as to
the timing of when a disclaimer is distributed to employees. As an illustration,
a number of courts have held that a disclaimer of implied warranties is
ineffective when made after the parties have entered a bargain for the sale
of goods. 03 Therefore, assuming that the employment-at-will contract is modifiable by the distribution of a personnel handbook, then an employer may
not limit promises made in the handbook by printing a subsequent disclaimer.
Moreover, in Helle v. Landmark, Inc.,"°4 the court held that an employer's
oral representations of severance pay which conflicted with a personnel manual disclaimer regarding deviation from company policies, or which caused
the employees to disregard the significance of such policies, negated the effect
101. Section 2-316(2) of the U.C.C. provides:
Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty of
merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchantability
and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any
implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if
it states, for example, that "There are no warranties which extend beyond
the description on the face hereof."
U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (1976).
102. J. WirE & R. SummERs, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 12-5, at 440-44 (2d ed. 1980).
103. See generally id. at 445-46.
104. 15 Ohio App. 3d 1, 472 N.E.2d 765 (1984).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol52/iss4/2

26

EMPLO YMENT AT WILL

1987]

Tabb: Tabb: Employee Innocence

of the disclaimer.0 5 In order for subsequently distributed disclaimers to modify at-will employment contracts, the employer and employee must satisfy
the requisites of contract modification. The requirements are demonstrated
by analogy in U.C.C. section 2-209.10
III.

GooD FiTH AND FAIR DEALiNG

Hamlet: What's the news?
Rosencrantz: None, my lord, but that the world's grown honest.
Hamlet: Then is doomsday near: but your news is not true.
"Hamlet" Act II, Scene 2.
A.

The Context: Employer Discretion vs. Employee Protection

The absolute right of an employer to discharge an at-will employee has
been curtailed in some jurisdictions by judicial recognition of an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the employment contract. 10 The
105. Id. at 10, 472 N.E.2d at 775.
106. Section 2-209 of the U.C.C. provides:
(1) An agreement modifying a contract within this Article needs no
consideration to be binding.
(2) A signed agreement which excludes modification or rescission except
by a signed writing cannot be otherwise modified or rescinded, but except
as between merchants such a requirement on a form supplied by the merchant
must be separately signed by the other party.
(3) The requirements of the statute of frauds section of this Article
(Section 2-201) must be satisfied if the contract as modified is within its
provisions.
(4) Although an attempt at modification or rescission does not satisfy
the requirements of subsection (2) or (3) it can operate as a waiver.
(5) A party who has made a waiver affecting an executory portion of
the contract may retract the waiver by reasonable notification received by
the other party that strict performance will be required of any term waived,
unless the retraction would be unjust in view of a material change of position
in reliance on the waiver.
U.C.C. § 2-209 (1976); see also Helle v. Landmark, Inc., 15 Ohio App. 3d 1, 13,
472 N.E.2d 765, 777 (1984). According to Corbin, the employer's offered promise
becomes irrevocable by him as soon as the employee has rendered any substantial
service in the process of accepting; and this is true in spite of the fact that the employee
may be privileged to quit the service at any time." IA A. CoRuIN, CONTRACTS § 153,
at 19-20 (1960).
107. See, e.g., Mitford v. de Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000, 1007 (Alaska 1983); Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, -, 710 P.2d 1025, 1040
(1985); Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 453, 168 Cal. Rptr.
722, 727-28 (1980); Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., 193 Conn. 558, 567-69, 479 A.2d
781, 786-87 (1984); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 103-04,
364 N.E.2d 1251, 1256-57 (1977); Gates v. Life of Montana Ins. Co., 196 Mont. 178,
185, 638 P.2d 1063, 1066 (1982).
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covenant is implied-in-law through the fiction of quasi-contract,10 as distinguished from implied-in-fact provisions which may be found in employee
handbooks or policy manuals. The obligation is imposed by law, apart from
or even contrary to the intentions of the employer and employee, for the
purpose of avoiding injustice in a bad faith discharge.? 9 The essence of the
implied good faith covenant is that neither party must do anything that would
injure or destroy the right of the other party to receive the benefits which
flow from their agreement or contractual relationship." 0
At least five divergent approaches to the role of good faith in the employment relationship have developed, with particular catalyzing force in
California and Massachusetts. The approaches include (1) finding that the
implied good faith and fair dealing covenant is breached if an employer
terminates an at-will employee with the wrongful intent of depriving the
employee of accrued or vested benefits, such as earned commissions,"' (2)
determining that the good faith covenant is implicated where a discharge
runs afoul of public policy," 2 (3) holding that the duration of employment,
together with special reliance by the employee, justifies implying the good
faith covenant," 3 (4) recognizing that the covenant of good faith is implied
in every contract, including employment agreements, (although recognizing
that the covenant does not create a duty that the employer terminate the
employee only for good cause)."14 The fifth, and most restrictive view, is that
courts will not imply a covenant of good faith into the at-will relationship
because of an unwillingness to predicate liability upon an inquiry into the
amorphous concept of bad faith." 5 In short, although the underlying ra108. Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, -, 710 P.2d
1025, 1038 (1985); Fireman's Ins. Co. v. Antol, 14 Ohio App. 3d 428, 429, 471
N.E.2d 831, 833 (1984).
109. See Gates v. Life of Montana Ins. Co., 196 Mont. 178, -, 638 P.2d
1063, 1067 (1982).
110. See Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 658, 328 P.2d
198, 200 (1958); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 104, 364
N.E.2d 1251, 1257 (1977); Hall v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 713 P.2d 1027, 1029-30 (Okla.
1985).
111. E.g., Mitford v. de Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000, 1007 (Alaska 1983); Fortune
v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 103-04, 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1256-57
(1977); Hall v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 713 P.2d 1027, 1031 (Okla. 1985).
112. E.g., Wynn v. Boeing Military Airplane Co., 595 F. Supp. 727, 729 (D.
Kan. 1984); Cort v. Bristol-Myers Co., 385 Mass. 300, 303, 431 N.E.2d 908, 910
(1982); see also Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 120 N.H. 295, 414 A.2d 1273 (1980);
Crowell v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 206 N.J. Super. 298, 502 A.2d 573 (1984).
113. E.g., Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 454, 168
Cal. Rptr. 722, 729 (1980).
114. E.g., Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370,
, 710
P.2d 1025, 1040 (1985); Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., 193 Conn. 558, 566-67, 479
A.2d 781, 786 (1984).
115. See Gordon v. Matthew Bender & Co., 562 F. Supp. 1286, 1290 (N.D.
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tionale of protecting employees from overreaching employers demonstrates
sympathy for implied-in-law contract rights, application of the various good
faith methodologies to employment contracts has been inconsistent and confusing.
Courts ascribing to the fourth and fifth approaches noted above have
declined to imply the covenant of good faith as a limit on managerial discretion over the workplace. These courts have stumbled over two critical
distinctions, one semantic and the other substantive. The threshold semantic
distinction lies in differentiating between a "good cause" or "just cause"
standard for dismissal and the "good faith" standard. The former, highlighted in Professor Summers' criticism of the at-will rule, 116 have well developed substantive and procedural connotations applicable to collective
bargaining agreements and statutory rights of public sector employees. The
covenant of good faith, in contrast, is implied by law to effectuate the
intentions of private contracting parties in the performance of their agreement. 1 7 The difference has been recognized by at least one court, which
stated "Where the employee has secured a promise not to be discharged
except for cause, he has contracted for more than the employer's promise
8
to act in good faith or not to be unreasonable.""1
Although several commentators have urged courts to adopt a "just cause"
standard for dismissals of at-will employees," 9 such a radical departure from
the common law is unnecessary. Rather than completely discarding the atwill rule as a historical anachronism, the rule should be reformulated to curb
discharges made in bad faith.
The substantive distinction concerning the good faith covenant involves
characterization of an at-will employee's expectation of job security. Courts
which have rejected the good faith covenant as a limitation of managerial
discretion have pronounced a two step analysis: the covenant, being implied,
Ill.
1983); Muller v. Stromberg Carlson Corp., 427 So. 2d 266, 270 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983); Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Haw. 370, 377, 652 P.2d 625, 629
(1982); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 227, 685 P.2d 1081,
1086 (1984); Brockmeyer v. Dunn & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 573, 335 N.W.2d
834, 840 (1983); Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702, 704 (Wyo.
1985).
116. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a
Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481, 499-501 (1976).
117. Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, -,
710 P.2d
1025, 1040 (1985).
118. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 623, 292 N.W.2d
880, 896 (1980).
119. See Peck, Unjust Dischargesfrom Employment: A Necessary Change in
the Law, 40 Omo ST. L.J. 1, 4 (1979); Note, ProtectingAt Will Employees Against
Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARv.L. REv.
1816, 1840 (1980); Note, Employment At Will: Just CauseProtection Through Mandatory Arbitration, 62 WAsH. L. REv. 151, 163-66 (1987).
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is not be read to contradict existing, bargained-for contractual terms; therefore, because the at-will contract provides for freedom of termination, the
good faith covenant cannot abrogate the employer's discretion to fire the
employee.120
This analysis, however, is critically flawed in two respects. First, the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not, and logically could not,
contradict any term in an employment contract because the function of the
covenant is to safeguard existing contractual rights and to act as the source
of a remedy if those rights are violated.
Secondly, the courts have too narrowly defined the at-will employee's
expectancy interest in the employment contract. Although an at-will employee
by definition has no justifiable expectation of either continued employment
or application of a "good cause" standard upon discharge, 121 the employee
should have a reasonable and protectable expectation not to be unfairly
discharged for "bad cause."'12 Where an employer discharges an employee
in bad faith the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing
should be breached and the employee deserves compensation for an infringement upon his expectancy interest. If the covenant of good faith is simply
a derivative principle which defines and modifies contractual duties 23 yet
does not restrict terminations made in bad faith, absent public policy
120. The court in Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293,
304-05, 448 N.E.2d 86, 91, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 237 (1983), explained as follows:
[T]he implied obligation is in aid and furtherance of other terms of the
agreement of the parties. No obligation can be implied, however, which
would be inconsistent with other terms of the contractual relationship. Thus,
in the case now before us, plaintiff's employment was at will, a relationship
in which the law accords the employer an unfettered right to terminate the
employment at any time. In the context of such an employment it would
be incongruous to say that an inference may be drawn that the employer
impliedly agreed to a provision which would be destructive of his right of
termination. The parties may by express agreement limit or restrict the employer's right of discharge, but to imply such a limitation from the existence
of an unrestricted right would be internally inconsistent. In sum, under New
York law as it now stands, absent a constitutionally impermissible purpose,
a statutory proscription or an express limitation in the individual contract
of employment, an employer's right at any time to terminate an employment
at will remains unimpaired.
121. See Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, -,
710
P.2d 1025, 1040 (1985); Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., 193 Conn. 558, 566-67, 479
A.2d 781, 786 (1984); Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293,
304-05, 448 N.E.2d 86, 91, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 237 (1983); Thomp~on v. St. Regis
Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 227, 685 P.2d 1081, 1086 (1984).
122. Wynn v. Boeing Military Airplane Co., 595 F. Supp. 727, 729 (D. Kan.
1984); Khanna v. Microdata Corp., 170 Cal. App. 3d 250, 262, 215 Cal. Rptr. 860,
867 (1985).
123. See Gordon v. Matthew Bender & Co., 562 F. Supp. 1286, 1289 (N.D.
Ill. 1983).
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4

violationsl or an employer receiving a financial windfall as a result of the
discharge,12 then it is a hollow covenant. The good faith covenant must be
viewed as more than an ideal or a lofty goal. It is a specific contractual
covenant which, if breached, should provide a remedy for the harmed employee.
A principled analysis should recognize an overriding policy against bad
faith discharges. Within that policy are both tort and contract duties and
their attendant remedies. The tort duty should be narrowly focused to remedy
bad faith discharges where the discharge either contravenes an important
expression of public policy or the circumstances surrounding the discharge
reflect particularly offensive conduct on the part of the employer. The public
policy exception to at-will discharges serves as a necessary and important
check in the balance of employer-employee relations. Its policy underpinnings, however, are broader than the particular private employment contract
involved because it is aimed at curtailing conduct which offends society as
a whole.12 6
Secondly, the general policy against bad faith discharges should include
potential contractual remedies for employer conduct which breaches the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. This covenant should protect
the employee's expectancy, reliance, and restitutionary interests in not being
deprived of the fruits of the employment contract.
Additional reasons for declining to read the good faith covenant into
an at-will contract have been that it would open the floodgates of litigation
and overburden courts,I 7 that the at-will rule would be eviscerated, 2 8 and
that bad faith is too amorphous. 129 Other reasons articulated have been an
unwillingness to impose a judicial substitute for collective bargaining agreements,' 30 and, closely allied, that the covenant of good faith would unrea124. See Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., 193 Conn. 558, 572, 479 A.2d 781, 789
(1984).
710
125. See Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, -,
P.2d 1025, 1040 (1985).
126. See Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Haw. 370, 378, 652 P.2d 625,
630 (1982).
127. Muller v. Stromberg Carlson Corp., 427 So. 2d 260, 269 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983); Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Haw. 370, 377, 652 P.2d 625, 629
(1982).
128. Gordon v. Matthew Bender & Co., 562 F. Supp. 1286, 1290 (N.D. Ill.
1983).
129. Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Haw. 370, 377, 652 P.2d 625, 629
(1982); Brockmeyer v. Dunn & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 569, 335 N.W.2d 834,
838 (1982).
130. Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 228, 685 P.2d 1081,
1086 (1984).
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sonably restrict employer discretion. 131 Thus, in Thompson v. St. Regis Paper
Company,3 2 the Supreme Court of Washington, with reference to the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, stated: "An employer's interest in
running his business as he sees fit must be balanced against the interest of
the employee in maintaining his employment and this exception does not
strike the proper balance."'' 3 The potential economic ramifications of any
perceived curtailment on employer discretion in discharging employees was
bluntly expressed in one Tennessee lower court opinion:
[A]ny substantial change in the "employee-at-will" rule should first be microscopically analyzed regarding its effect on the commerce of this state....
Tennessee has made enormous strides in recent years in its attraction of new
industry of high quality designed to increase the average per capita income
of its citizens and thus, better the quality of their lives. The impact on the
continuation of such influx of new businesses should be carefully considered
before any substantial modification is made in the employee-at-will rule.134
Finally, as articulated in Murphy v. American Home ProductsCorp.,'1 some
view any significant modification of the traditional at-will rule as properly
left to the legislature:
It may well be that in the light of modern economic and social considerations
radical changes should be made. As all of us recognize, however, resolution
of the critical issues turns on identification and balancing of fundamental
components of public policy. Recognition of an implied-in-law obligation
of good faith as restricting the employer's right to terminate is as much a
part of this matrix as is recognition of the tort action for abusive discharge.
We are of the view that this aggregate of rights and obligations should not
be approached piecemeal but should be considered in its totality and then
resolved by the Legislature.'16
Although comprehensive legislative action would certainly be desirable, it has
not yet happened and it does not realistically appear to be forthcoming.
Therefore, because the at-will doctrine was judicially created, 137 courts should
be adequately equipped to provide a forum for changing the current inequities
in the rule. The at-will rule does serve a useful function in the non-union
workplace and should not be entirely discarded in favor of a system tantamount to universalizing collective-bargaining agreements or statutory public
131. Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 228, 685 P.2d 1081,
1086 (1984); Brockmeyer v. Dunn & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 569, 335 N.W.2d
834, 838 (1983).
132. 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984).
133. Id. at 224, 685 P.2d at 1086.
134. Whittaker v. Care-More, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 395, 396-97 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1981).
135. 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983).
136. rd. at 299 n.2, 448 N.E.2d at 92 n.2, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 238 n.2.
137. See Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Haw. 370, 652 P.2d 625 (1982).
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sector employment rights. Recognition of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, however, would not unduly interfere with normal managerial discretion because only firings made in bad faith would be proscribed.
The fear of proliferating lawsuits against employers should go unrealized if
courts have a clear framework and guidelines within which to evaluate meritorious claims concerning abusive discharge. Similarly, the proposed modification of the at-will rule should not present a severe economic disincentive
to attract new industry when employer liability would be imposed only for
bad faith treatment of employees. "Freedom of contract" surely was never
intended to serve as a complete defense to overreaching or unfair treatment
of the other party.
B.

The CaliforniaHeritage: Confusion of Implied-in-Fact and Implied-inLaw Rights

A special approach to the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
in employment at-will relationships has developed in the California courts,
principally during the last decade. Although California has codified the common law at-will rule, 38 courts have riddled the rule with exceptions.3 9 Thus,
current California law concerning the implied covenant of good faith is
represented by several often contradictory trends. Because of the influence
California law has had in the area of implied-in-law considerations affecting
the at-will employee, it is instructive to review the historical progression and
subsequent divergence of California judicial sentiment.
138.

CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (Supp. 1986) provides: "An employment, having

no specified term, may be terminated at the will of either party on notice to the
other. Employment for a specified term means an employment for a period of greater
than one month."
139. California law recognizes three distinct exceptions to the employment atwill rule: (1) where the employee is wrongfully discharged for a reason which contravenes public policy, Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 172, 610
P.2d 1330, 1332, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 841 (1980); (2) the contract contains an impliedin-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc.,
111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 729 (1980); and (3) the employment
contract embodies implied-in-fact promises which limit the employer's conduct in
terminating an employee, Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 329,
171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 927 (1981). In Koehrer v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1155,
1163, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820, 824 (1986), the court observed:
It would be conducive to proper analysis if courts and lawyers used a different nomenclature to denominate these different situations in which liability is imposed after all on different legal theories. Appropriate nomenclature
might be "breach of employment contract" for the true breach of contract
cases, "tortious discharge" for the public policy cases and "bad faith discharge" for the cases involving breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing.
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An early expression of the role of the good faith covenant appeared in
Nelson v. Abraham,'1" which involved whether a manager was entitled to an
accounting and division of profits pursuant to an oral contract. Although
the case did not involve termination of an at-will employee, it is significant
in several respects. The California Supreme Court in Nelson recognized that
every contract contained "an implied covenant that neither party shall do
anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the rights of
the other party to receive the fruits of the contract, which means that in
every contract there exists an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing."' 4' The court adopted this language from a 1933 New York Court
of Appeals decision, Kirke La Shelle v. Paul Armstrong Co.,142 which involved an agreement to share in profits from production of a play. In Kirke
La Shelle and Nelson an important factor which implicated the covenant of
good faith was the fiduciary relationship between the parties which originated
in the contract itself.' 43 This historical basis is significant in that, despite a
common beginning, California courts later focused on the good faith covenant as a separate and independent basis of liability ' 44 while a recent influential New York decision held that the implied obligation modified the parties'
agreement but was insufficient to alter the at-will relationship. 145
A series of California Supreme Court decisions regarding the function
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in insurance contracts
also has established an important predicate for applying the covenant in
employment relationships. In Comunale v. Traders& GeneralInsuranceCo. ,'4
the court held that the implied covenant of good faith required the defendant
insurance company to defend the insured and to accept reasonable settlement
terms within the policy limits even though the express terms of the contract
did not impose such duties.1 47 The duty arose out of respect for and consideration of the interests of the insured. The defendant's wrongful conduct in
failing to meet its duty constituted a breach of the implied covenant of good
faith' 48 which justified imposing liability against the insurance company in
149
excess of the policy coverage.
140. 29 Cal. 2d 745, 177 P.2d 931 (1947).
141. Id. at 751, 177 P.2d at 934 (quoting Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong
Co., 263 N.Y. 79, 87, 188 N.E. 163, 167 (1933)).
142. 263 N.Y. 79, 188 N.E. 163 (1933).
143. Kirke La Shelle, 263 N.Y. at 85, 188 N.E. at 166; Nelson, 29 Cal. 2d at
750, 177 P.2d at 934.
144. See Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 453, 168
Cal. Rptr. 722, 728 (1980).
145. Murphy v. American Home Prods., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461
N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983).
146. 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
147. Id. at 659, 328 P.2d at 201.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 661, 328 P.2d at 202. Also important inComunale was the idea
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In Gruenbergv. Aetna Insurance Co.,150 the California Supreme Court
applied the covenant of good faith to find the insurance company liable in
contract and in tort for unreasonably withholding payments due under a
policy. 5' The court rejected the defendant's argument that the plaintiff's
conduct excused performance by the defendant, stating that the duty of good
independent of the performfaith, implied by law, was "unconditional and
5 2
obligations."'
contractual
ance of plaintiff's
Finally, in Commercial Union Assurance Companies v. Safeway Stores,
Inc.,' 53 the court found that, although the duty of good faith in an insurance
policy is a "two-way street," the insured owned no corresponding duty to
its excess liability carrier to accept a settlement offer within the policy limits.154 The court thus focused the good faith inquiry upon the legitimate
expectations of the parties based upon the nature of the contractual bargain
and determined that the excess carrier could not reasonably have expected
the insured to consider the interests of the excess carrier." 5 The Commercial
Union decision set the stage for the important California trilogy Tameny v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 6 Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc.,157 and Pugh v.
that breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing may sound in
contract or in tort to give the plaintiff freedom of election between contract and tort
actions for statute of limitation purposes. Id. at 663, 328 P.2d at 203. Similarly, in
Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967),
the court permitted the plaintiff to recover in tort for mental suffering and losses
incurred in a judgment against the insured caused by the insurer's breach of the good
faith covenarit in wrongfully failing to settle. Crisci, 66 Cal. 2d at 433-34, 426 P.2d
at 178-79, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 18-19. For a discussion of the remedial ramifications of
the characterization of breach of the good faith covenant as contract or tort, see
infra Section E. of text. The court in Crisci expanded the meaning of the implied
covenant by rejecting the defendant's argument that bad faith must be equivalent to
"dishonesty, fraud and concealment," but rather was implicated when the expectations of the insured were not satisfied. Crisci, 66 Cal. 2d at 430, 426 P.2d at 177,
58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
150. 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
151. Id. at 575, 510 P.2d at 1038, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
152. Id. at 578, 510 P.2d at 1040, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 488. The court further
stated:
We conclude, therefore, that the duty of good faith and fair dealing on the
part of defendant insurance companies is an absolute one. At the same time,
we do not say that the parties cannot define, by the terms of the contract,
their respective obligations and duties. We say merely that no matter how
those duties are stated, the non-performance by one party of its contractual
duties cannot excuse a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing by
the other party while the contract between them is in effect and not rescinded.
Id.
153. 26 Cal. 3d 912, 610 P.2d 1038, 164 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1980).
154. Id. at 917-19, 610 P.2d at 1041-42, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 711-13.
155. Id. at 919-20, 610 P.2d at 1042, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
156. 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980).
157. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
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See's Candies, Inc..'58 Each of these three cases addressed the applicability
of the good faith covenant in the employment at-will context.
In Tameny, the California Supreme Court recognized a cause of action
in tort in favor of an employee who was wrongfully discharged for refusing
to participate in a scheme to fix retail gasoline prices which would have
allegedly violated federal antitrust laws.1 59 The court stated that a wrongful
discharge action based upon statute or public policy considerations could be
brought either in contract or in tort.' 60 Apart from its public policy analysis,
the court made significant and far-reaching statements with regard to the
entire employment at-will doctrine. The court examined the historical basis
for the at-will rule but cautioned as follows:
In the last half century the rights of employees have not only been proclaimed
by a mass of legislation touching upon almost every aspect of the employeremployee relationship, but the courts have likewise evolved certain additional
protections at common law. The courts have been sensitive to the need to
protect the individual employee from discriminatory exclusion from the opportunity of employment whether it be by the all-powerful union or employer. This development at common law shows that the employer is not so
absolute a sovereign of the job that there are not limits to his prerogative.
One such limit at least is the present case. The employer cannot condition
employment upon required participation in unlawful conduct by the employee.161
More importantly with regard to the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, the court relied upon its prior holdings in the insurance context and
suggested in dictum that an employer's breach of the covenant would possibly
give rise to tort recovery for the discharged employee.1 62 Tameny marked the
158. 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981).
159. Tameny, 27 Cal. 3d at 172, 610 P.2d at 1332, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 841. The
court held that:
[A]n employer's authority over its employee does not include the right to
demand that the employee commit a criminal act to further its interests, and
an employer may not coerce compliance with such unlawful directions by
discharging an employee who refuses to follow such an order. An employer
engaging in such conduct violates a basic duty imposed by law upon all
employers, and thus an employee who has suffered damages as a result of
such discharge may maintain a tort action for wrongful discharge against
the employer.
Id. at 178, 610 P.2d at 1036-37, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 846.
160. Id. at 176, 610 P.2d at 1335, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
161. Id. at 178, 610 P.2d. at 1336, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 845 (citations omitted).
162. The court stated:
In light of our conclusion that plaintiff's complaint states a cause of action
in tort under California's common law wrongful discharge doctrine, we
believe it is unnecessary to determine whether a tort recovery would additionally be available under these circumstances on the theory that Arco's
discharge constituted a breach of the implied-at-law covenant of good faith
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first time in a non-insurance setting that a California court recognized that
the implied covenant of good faith imposed limits on an employer's discretion
with respect to an at-will employee.
Tameny was shortly followed by the landmark decision of Cleary v.
American Airlines, Inc.,163 which directly confronted the issue of whether the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing could serve as the basis for an
independent cause of action for wrongful discharge. The plaintiff employee
was discharged after eighteen years of employment, allegedly in retaliation
for participation in union activities. The complaint, dismissed upon demurrer,
asserted both breach of contract and tort theories for wrongful discharge,
and sought compensatory and punitive damages.164 The court followed the
lead of Tameny and expressly recognized that the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing was "unconditional and independent in nature" and would
be implied in all contracts. 65 Thus, the court established a cause of action
for a bad faith discharge for breach of the covenant of good faith implicit
in employment contracts.'
The court in Cleary focused on the employee's longevity of service and
the employer's policies of providing procedures for solving employee grievances as being of "paramount importance" in operating as an estoppel against
a discharge without good cause. 67 The court stated:
Termination of employment without legal cause after such a period of time
offends the implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing contained
in all contracts, including employment contracts. As a result of this covenant,
a duty arose on the part of the employer ...

to do nothing which would

deprive plaintiff, the employee, of the benefits of the employment bargainbenefits described in the complaint as having accrued during plaintiff's 18
years of employment.1"
and fair dealing inherent in every contract. We do note in this regard,
however, that authorities in other jurisdictions have on occasion found an
employer's discharge of an at-will employee violative of the employer's "good
faith and fair dealing" obligations, and past California cases have held that
a breach of this implied-at-law covenant sounds in tort as well as in contract.
Since neither plaintiff nor defendants suggest that the elements of a cause
of action for breach of the implied covenant in this context would differ
from the elements of an ordinary wrongful discharge action, however, we
believe that a separate discussion of the "good faith and fair dealing"
covenant in this case is unnecessary.
Id. at 179 n.12, 610 P.2d at 1337 n.12, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 846 n.12 (citations omitted).
163. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
164. Id. at 446, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 723-24.
165. Id. at 453, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 728.
166. Id. at 455-56, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
167. Id. at 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
168. Id.
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The court did not, however, delve into the plaintiff's cause of action for
retaliatory discharge for engaging in union activities, but rather premised its
169
decision squarely on the implied covenant of good faith.
The analysis in Cleary reflects an unfortunate mixture of several distinct
causes of action for wrongfully discharged at will employees. The Cleary
court's focus on longevity of satisfactory service presents an immediate obstacle to application. How many years would be sufficient to implicate the
good faith covenant? Subsequent California decisions have wrestled with this
dilemma, reaching irreconcilable results.1 70 Also, are the factors enumerated
in Cleary exclusive or simply illustrative? Again, California courts have reached
diametrically opposite views on this question.' 7 1 Perhaps the most grievous
flaw in Cleary, though, was the court's reliance upon the employer's policies
regarding employee disputes as being relevant to the good faith covenant.
Such company policies may, in appropriate circumstances, serve as the basis
for showing an implied-in-fact promise to treat an employee in a certain
manner,' 72 but should not be confused with an implied-in-law analysis.
A similar mixing of the implied-in-fact and implied-in-law contract theories occurred in Gates v. Life of Montana Insurance Co. 73 (Gates I), a
Montana Supreme Court decision. In Gates the plaintiff alleged wrongful
deprivation of unemployment and retirement benefits because the employer
obtained a letter of resignation by duress. The plaintiff claimed, among other
theories, both breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing.
169. Id. at 455-56, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729-30.
170. See Crain v. Burroughs Corp., 560 F. Supp. 849, 853 (C.D. Cal. 1983)
(less than two years employment insufficient); Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 174
Cal. App. 3d 241, 246, 219 Cal. Rptr. 866, 871, review granted, 712 P.2d 891, 222
Cal. Rptr. 740 (1985) (seven years employment too short for longevity test); Shapiro
v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 478, 199 Cal. Rtpr. 613, 619
(1984) (three and one-half years inadequate); Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal.
App. 3d 311, 328, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 926-27 (1981) (thirty-two years would not
suffice, in itself, to implicate good faith covenant); cf. Comerio v. Beatrice Foods
Co., 600 F. Supp. 765, 769 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (applying California law; three years
service inadequate).
171. Courts which have limited their inquiry to the Cleary factors include
Comerio v. Beatrice Foods Co., 600 F. Supp. 765, 769 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (applying
California law); Crain v. Burroughs Corp., 560 F. Supp. 849, 853 (C.D. Cal. 1983);
Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 174 Cal. App. 3d 241, 246, 219 Cal. Rptr. 866, 871,
review granted, 712 P.2d 891, 222 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1985); and Shapiro v. Wells Fargo
Realty Advisors, 152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 478, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613, 619 (1984). On the
other hand, several courts have interpreted Cleary as only providing instruction, not
conclusive factors. See, e.g., Gray v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 813, 820-21,
226 Cal. Rptr. 570, 573-74 (1986); Khanna v. Microdata Corp., 170 Cal. App. 3d
250, 262, 215 Cal. Rptr. 860, 867 (1985).
172. E.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d
880 (1980).
173. 196 Mont. 178, 638 P.2d 1063 (1982).
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Two years after hiring Gates, the employer distributed a handbook containing certain procedures regarding termination. The court held that, because
Gates had not supplied any additional consideration apart from the agreed
services, the handbook's notice requirement did not become part of the atwill employment contract and was therefore unenforceable as a contract
174

right.

More significantly, the court, although not expressly relying upon Cleary,
recognized that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing properly accommodated the respective interests of employers and employees and should be
implied in employment contracts. 175 The court then noted that the employer's
issuance of employee policies created an expectation of job security, and
when not followed "the peace of mind of its employees is shattered and an
injustice is done."'' 76 Accordingly, the court held that the plaintiff's assertion
that the employer failed to follow its termination procedures precluded summary judgment and, if proven on remand, would constitute a breach of the
77
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
The analysis in Gates I creates an interesting paradox: employee policies
contained in a handbook did not constitute enforceable implied-in-fact promises because they were distributed without consideration after hiring. However, the failure to follow such policies would amount to an "injustice" and
a breach of the implied-in-law covenant of good faith. Mixture of the impliedin-fact and implied-in-law contract exceptions to the employment at-will rule
as in Cleary and Gates I presents impracticable standards for application and
dilutes the policy underpinnings and evidentiary basis for each theory. The
Montana Supreme Court further complicated the remedial picture when it
evaluated the award of punitive damages after remand in Gates 11. 78 The
court was faced with a statute which would, in certain circumstances, permit
assessment of punitive damages for breach of an obligation "not arising
from contract."' 79 The court held that since the duty to act in good faith
existed apart from and in addition to the contract terms, the statutory prohibition was not applicable. 180 Therefore, the court reasoned, breach of the
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in the employment relationship
174. Id. at 183, 638 P.2d. at 1066.
175. Id. at 184-85, 638 P.2d at 1066-67.
176. Id. at 184, 638 P.2d at 1067.
177. Id.
178. Gates v. Life of Montana Ins. Co. (Gates II), 205 Mont. 304, 668 P.2d
213 (1983).
179. MoNT. CoDE ANN. § 27-1-221 (1983) provided:
In any action for a breach of an obligation not arising from contract where
the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, actual or
presumed, the jury, in addition to the actual damages, may give damages
for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.
180. Gates II, 205 Mont. at 307, 668 P.2d at 215.
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sounded in tort and permitted the jury's award of punitive damages. The
Gates II analysis represents an interesting display of judicial gymnastics where
the court simultaneously advanced the propositions that good faith and fair
dealing was an implied-by-law contractual covenant, yet did not "arise from"
the contract.'
The third significant decision in the California trilogy which has largely
shaped the contours of the good faith covenant in employment at-will relationships was Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc.. 8 2 The plaintiff employee, Pugh,
had a successful 32 year career with the defendant company which was
highlighted by numerous promotions and by his ultimately becoming vicepresident and a member of the board of directors. When Pugh returned from
a vacation he was summoned to the corporate offices expecting to be told
of another promotion. Instead, the company president discharged him summarily without explanation. In addition to asserting claims for breach of
contract, Pugh alleged that the firing was in retaliation for his opposition
to management's pay scale to its labor union and thus constituted a tortious
discharge which violated public policy."8 3 The company responded by claiming
that Pugh's at-will status allowed the termination, irrespective of the cause.
The case principally examined Pugh's assertion that the defendant made
certain implied-in-fact promises that it would not deal arbitrarily with its
employees. The relevant considerations which the court noted in that regard
included the duration of Pugh's employment, his promotions and satisfactory
performance evaluations, the lack of complaints about his work, and the
employer's express policies concerning employees.'14 The court summarized
the operation of these factors as follows:
While oblique language will not, standing alone, be sufficient to establish
agreement, it is appropriate to consider the totality of the parties' relationship. Agreement may be "shown by the acts and conduct of the parties,
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 306-07, 668 P.2d at 214-15.
116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981).
Id. at 318-19, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 920. Pugh asserted three separate bases

to justify the tort action for retaliatory discharge contravening public policy. First,
Pugh claimed that the union contract which he refused to support would have violated
state and federal antitrust law against restraint of trade. Although the court acknowledged that the contention found "doctrinal support" in Tameny, it was rejected for

lack of evidentiary basis. Id. at 322-23, 171 Cal. Rptr. 922-23. Secondly, Pugh contended that the union wage agreement which he objected to violated the Fair Em-

ployment Practices Act (now Fair Employment and Housing Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE
§§ 12900-12996. (Supp. 1988)) because it wrongfully discriminated against women.

Again, the court held that the claim failed for lack of evidentiary support. Pugh,
116 Cal. App. 3d at 323, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 923. Lastly, Pugh claimed that the discharge

violated CAL. CORP. CODE § 309(a) (West 1977), but the court held that he had not
acted in the requisite capacity of an "inquiring corporate director" within the meaning
of the statute. Pugh, 116 Cal. App. 3d at 324, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 923-24.
184. Pugh, 116 Cal. App. 3d at 329, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927.
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interpreted in the light of the subject matter and of the surrounding circumstances.'"85

Although the court dealt mainly with public policy and implied-in-fact limitations on employment at-will, it significantly qualified the Cleary approach
to the implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court
recognized the premise for the implied covenant in Tameny and then examined the dual basis for the holding in Cleary: longevity of employment
and the employer's express policies of adjudicating employee grievances. 86
With regard to Cleary's duration of employment factor, the Pugh court
stated:
If "[tlermination of employment without legal cause [after 18 years of service] offends the implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing contained in all contracts, including employment contracts," . . . then afortiori
that covenant would provide protection to Pugh, whose employment is nearly
twice that duration. Indeed, it seems difficult to defend termination of such
a long-time employee arbitrarily, i.e., without some legitimate reason, as
compatible with either good faith or fair dealing.
We need not go that far, however. In Cleary, the court did not base
its holding upon the covenant of good faith and fair dealing alone. Its
decision rested also upon the employer's acceptance of responsibility for
refraining from arbitrary conduct, as evidence by its adoption of specific
procedures for adjudicating employee grievances. While the court characterized the employer's conduct as constituting "[recognition of] its responsibility to engage in good faith and fair dealing," the result is equally explicable
in traditional contract terms: the employer's conduct gave rise to an implied
87
promise that it would not act arbitrarily in dealing with its employees.1

Thus, presented with an ideal opportunity to clarify the confusion in Cleary
over implied-in-fact and implied-in-law limitations on employer discretion to
fire at-will employees, the Pugh court instead chose to skirt the problem.

The progeny of Tameny, Cleary, and Pugh have not yielded any consistent methodology as to what factors or standards should be applied to the

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in at-will employment contracts. In Crosierv. United ParcelService, Inc.,' 88 an employee with 25 years
of service with the defendant employer was allegedly discharged for violating
an unwritten company policy prohibiting social relationships between management and non-managerial personnel. The plaintiff-employee claimed that
company rules proscribing fraternization with non-management employees
were arbitrary and unreasonable, and therefore violated the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. The court acknowledged some merit in the
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 328-29, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 926-27.
Id. (citations omitted).
150 Cal. App. 3d 1132, 198 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1983).
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plaintiff's assertion of unfairness but also emphasized the interest of an
employer in managing its work force:
[T]he court must balance the employer's interest in operating his business
efficiently and profitably with the interest of the employee in maintaining
his employment and the interest of the public in maintaining a proper balance
between the two. 19
The court, however, rejected the defendant's proposition that the legitimacy
of an employer's business reasons for discharging an at-will employee should
escape judicial review. 190 The court, relying upon the Pugh requirements,
held that the plaintiff's assertions of improper employer motives were merely
speculative and thus insufficient to satisfy the requisite evidentiary burden. 191
In the context of assessing the burden of producing evidence and proof,
however, the court in Crosier stated "the implied in law covenant [of good
faith] and implied in fact covenant are similar in that both require just cause
for dismissal."' 92 Certainly, as discussed in Part II., an employer may make
promises of job security which would allow dismissal only for good cause
or just cause, and which may be properly implied-in-fact into the employment
contract. 93 However, the characterization of the good faith covenant as
equivalent to or co-extensive with a just cause standard for dismissal of atwill employees is simply incorrect. The just cause standard, presently applicable in collective bargaining agreements and statutes governing public employees, gives greater job protection to employees.' 94 Moreover, the two
standards have different functions. Good faith serves as a flexible tool to
correct a wide range of possible employer abuses, 95 while "just cause" fo96
cuses on whether the emplbyee's conduct justifies the dismissal.
189. Id. at 1139, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
190. The court stated:
This rule would parallel the business judgment rule which prevents judicial
scrutiny of the acts of corporate directors using honest judgment. We decline
to adopt such a rule. An implied in fact or implied in law promise to dismiss
an employee only for cause would be illusory if the employer were permitted
to be the sole judge and final arbiter of the propriety of the policy giving
rise to the discharge. If we were to adopt such a rule, an employer could
implement a patently absurd business policy carapaced from judicial inquiry.
Id. at 1140, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
191. Id. at 1139, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
192. Id. at 1138, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
193. See supra notes 25-89 and accompanying text.
194. See M. TROTTA, ARBITRATION oF LABOR-MANAGEMENT Disrurrs 236-42
(1974); Peck, Unjust Dischargesfrom Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law,
40 Omo ST. L.J. 1, 8 (1979).
195. Khanna v. Microdata Corp., 170 Cal. App. 3d 250, 262-63, 215 Cal. Rptr.
860, 867 (1985).
196. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880

(1980).
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A more expansive application of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing is found in another recent California appellate court decision,
Khanna v. Microdata Corp. 97 The employee, Khanna, achieved an outstanding sales record and received commendations from his employer. While still
employed, Khanna sued the company to recover the amount of certain disputed commissions. The company subsequently fired him, asserting that the
lawsuit was "totally unfounded" and that the employee had exhibited "disloyalty." The employee sued198 on all three theories of wrongful discharge
and the jury returned a general verdict in his favor without specifying which
theory of liability it relied upon.'99 The court found that elements regarding
each wrongful discharge theory were present but upheld the jury award solely
on the company's violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.0
The most significant aspect of Khanna was the court's liberal reading
of Cleary's treatment of the implied covenant of good faith. The court
reviewed the post-Pugh trend of limiting Cleary to its facts 20 by stating:
We cannot agree ... that the factors relied on by the court in Cleary are
the sine qua non to establishing a breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing implied in every employment contract ...To the contrary, a
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment
contracts is established whenever the employer engages in "bad faith action
extraneous to the contract, combined with the obligor's intent to frustrate
the [employee's] enjoyment of contract rights."'
The court considered the plaintiff's sales performance, commendations, timing of the discharge, the discharge's effect of preventing the plaintiff from
receiving substantial commissions, and the apparent discrepancies in the contract terms regarding commission payments as together providing a substan23
tial basis for the jury's finding of bad faith discharge.
197. 170 Cal. App. 3d 250, 215 Cal. Rptr. 860 (1985).
198. Khanna dismissed the suit after being discharged in hopes that the company would pay the commission. When the company continued to deny liability,
however, Khanna reinstated the suit alleging wrongful discharge, fraud and breach
of contract. Id. at 254, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 864.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 260, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 865.
201. See Comerio v. Beatrice Foods, Co., 600 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Mo. 1985)
(applying California law); Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 174 Cal. App. 3d 175,
219 Cal. Rptr. 866, review granted, 712 P.2d 891, 222 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1985); Shapiro
v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613 (1984).
202. Khanna v. Microdata Corp., 170 Cal. App. 3d 250, 263, 215 Cal. Rptr.
860, 867 (1985).
203. Id. at 264-65, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 868-69.
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In sum, the California courts have recognized both implied-in-fact and
implied-in-law limitations on the freedom of employers to discharge at-will
employees. 10 The analysis, however, has demonstrated an unfortunate blurring of the two theories, and thus has created inconsistent and misleading
precedent. The Cleary factors regarding length of employment service and
handbook provisions of a "just cause" standard for dismissal2°5 properly fit
under implied-in-fact contract methodology. In contrast, some of the factors
mentioned in Khanna, such as whether the discharge effectively deprived the
employee of financial benefits to the employer's gain,- 6 should be evaluated
in light of the implied-in-law covenant of good faith. The covenant of good
faith should restrict discharges made for a bad cause, but should not be
implicated for discharges made either for good cause or no cause. This
approach would properly effectuate the reasonable expectations of employees
to be treated equitably, while still preserving managerial discretion over the
workplace.
C. Massachusetts: The Restitutionary Basis
Massachusetts courts have articulated two separate bases for an employee
at-will to state a cause of action for wrongful discharge: (1) where an employer violates public policy by acting with the "predatory" motive to deprive
an employee of rightful financial benefits for the purpose of retaining those
benefits; 2°7 or (2) where a discharged employee will lose ascertainable future
financial benefits based upon past services, 20s irrespective of evidence of bad
motive on the part of the employer.
The first approach to the treatment of the good faith principle in the
employment context holds than an employer who discharges an employee
because of a wrongful intent to deprive the employee of certain vested benefits breaches the at-will employment contract. 2 9 This analysis had its genesis
in the Massachusetts decision of Fortune v. National Cash Register Co.. 2 10
204. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164
Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980); Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal.
Rptr. 917 (1981); Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 722 (1980).
205. Cleary, 111 Cal. App. 3d at 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
206. Khanna, 170 Cal. App, 3d at 263-64, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 868-69.
207. See Cort v. Bristol-Myers Co., 385 Mass. 300, 304, 431 N.E.2d 908, 910
(1982); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 104-05, 364 N.E.2d
1251, 1257 (1977).
208. See Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 384 Mass. 659, 671-72, 429 N.E.2d
21, 29 (1981).
209. See Mitford v. de Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000, 1007 (Alaska 1983); Fortune v.
National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 104, 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1257 (1977); Hall
v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 713 P.2d 1027, 1031 (Okla. 1985).
210. 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977).
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In Fortune, the plaintiff salesman was entitled to commissions on orders he
obtained for the company, but his written contract of employment allowed
termination at will without cause on written notice. The defendant company
gave the plaintiff, an employee for twenty-five years, the requisite notice of
discharge one business day after the plaintiff had obtained a $5,000,000
order. The company allowed the plaintiff to work for an additional eighteen
month period following receipt of the notice, but in a lesser position which
did not allow payment of commissions. However, the employee did receive
21
the commissions to which he was contractually entitled. '
The court nevertheless upheld the submission to the jury of the issue
regarding the employer's "motive" in terminating the employment. 212 The
question of motive, then, was relevant to whether the employer had breached
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing despite an express contract provision which reserved to the employer the unqualified power to
21 3
discharge the employee.
The case is anomalous in several respects. First, the court declined to
categorize a breach of the implied covenant of good faith as a tort action,
but rather limited it to a contractual remedy. 214 The immediate difficulty with
couching it solely as a contract remedy was that the employee actually received all the commissions to which he was entitled under the contract.
Therefore, the restitutionary principle of preventing the unjust enrichment
of an overreaching employer was not involved. The court's recognition of
the restitutionary goal of protecting employees from overreaching employer
conduct 2 5 however has unfortunately caused the case to be mischaracterized
as having only a restitutionary basis. 21 6 Professor Epstein, in defending em211. Id. at 99, 101, 364 N.E.2d at 1254-55.
212. Id. at 100, 364 N.E.2d at 1255.
213. Id. at 101, 364 N.E.2d at 1256. The court explained:
We do not question the general principles that an employer is entitled to be
motivated by and to serve its own legitimate business interests; that an
employer must have wide latitude in deciding whom it will employ in the
face of uncertainties of the business world; and that an employer needs
flexibility in the face of changing circumstances. We recognize the employer's
need for a large amount of control over its work force. However, we believe
that where, as here, commissions are to be paid for work performed by the
employee, the employer's decision to terminate its at will employee should
be made in good faith.
Id.
214. Id. at 102, 364 N.E.2d at 1256.
215. Id. at 105, 364 N.E.2d at 1257.
216. In Mitford v. de Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000, 1007 (Alaska 1983), the Supreme
Court of Alaska relied upon Fortune and held that the implied covenant of good
faith dealing would prevent the defendant employer from terminating the employee
for the purpose of depriving him from receiving future profits otherwise payable
according to an employment contract. The court loosely referred to this view as the
"prevention doctrine," taken also from its interpretation of the Restatement (Second)
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ployment at-will, 2 7 recognized the fallacy of the restitution theory in Fortune
and thus concluded that the implied covenant of good faith should yield to
freedom of contract. 2 8 The good faith covenant should be read more broadly
than as being synonymous with restitution. Rather, in addition to the interest
in receiving restitution, at-will employees have another interest which is also
deserving of legal protection, and that is the expectation not to be discharged
in bad faith.
In sum, the ill-timed discharge of a faithful long-term employee may be
"full of sound and fury"21 9 but have no real pecuniary significance to the
employer. Further, the Fortune court declined to speculate as. to whether the
covenant of good faith would always be implied in at-will employment contracts. 22° The impact of the case cannot be gainsaid, however, because it did
recognize that a breach of the covenant of good faith will result in remedial
consequences.221
In Gram v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,222 (Gram I) the Massachusetts
Supreme Court had an opportunity to address the questions reserved in
of Contracts section 205 (1981) which provides: "Every contract imposes upon each
party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance or its enforcement."
In Hall v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 713 P.2d 1027, 1030 (Okla. 1985), an insurance
agent successfully maintained a breach of implied covenant of good faith action for
termination by the employer by demonstrating a wrongful intent to deprive him of
future payments of renewal premiums. Although Hall agreed with the analysis in
Fortune, it also predicated its holding on the Restatement (Second) of Agency section
454 which states:
An agent to whom the principal has made a revocable offer of compensation
if he accomplishes a specific result is entitled to the promised amount if the
principal, in order to avoid the payment of it revokes the offer and thereafter
the result is accomplished as the result of the agent's prior efforts.
RESTATEbMNT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 454 (1958).
217. See Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. Cm. L. Rv. 947
(1984).
218. Id. at 982.
219. SHAKESPEARE, MacBeth, act V., scene V.
220. The court stated:
In the instant case, we need not pronounce our adherence to so broad a
policy nor need we speculate as to whether the good faith requirement is
implicit in every contract for employment at will. It is clear, however, that,
on the facts before us, a finding is warranted that a breach of the contract
occurred. Where the principal seeks to deprive the agent of all compensation
by terminating the contractual relationship when the agent is on the brink
of successfully completing the sale, the principal has acted in bad faith and
the ensuing transaction between the principal and the buyer is to be regarded
as having been accomplished by the agent.
Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 104-05, 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1257
(1977).
221. Id. at 96, 364 N.E.2d at 1256.
222. 384 Mass. 659, 429 N.E.2d 21 (1981).
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Fortune of whether an obligation to act in good faith was implicit in every
at-will employment contract, and whether the absence of good cause in the
discharge of an employee was co-extensive with the absence of good faith.m2
In Gram I an insurance agent was discharged without cause but the employer
had no improper motive behind the discharge. The court rejected the view
that the termination of an at-will employee without good cause would alone
constitute a violation of the employer's duty of good faith and fair dealing.22
Rather, a discharge absent good cause would not establish bad faith but
would be considered a factor in ascertaining whether fair dealing exsted?2The significance of Gram I, then, was in rejecting job security as the sole
basis for justifying recovery in termination of an at-will employee without
good cause.22 The court remanded for a determination of the amount of
damages that the employer owed for the employee's past service.227
An important aspect of the Massachusetts line of cases is the treatment
of damages for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
The courts have focused on restitutionary principles of preventing the unjust
enrichment of employers and have therefore characterized the cause of action
as sounding in contract rather than in tort,2 or on a quantum merit theory. 229
223. See id. at 664, 429 N.E.2d at 26.
224. Id. at 666, 429 N.E.2d at 28. The court recognized that collective bargaining agreements and certain public employment statutes only permit a just cause
discharge, but implicitly left it to legislative action to change the balance of employment rights then existing under the common law. Id. at 671, 429 N.E.2d at 28. The
court also noted that the meaning of good faith in terminating contracts may require
something more than the meaning of good faith in section 2-103(1)(b) of the Uniform
Commercial Code which requires "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction
concerned." U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b) (1976).
225. Gram I, 384 Mass. at 665, 429 N.E.2d at 27.
226. Id. at 677, 429 N.E.2d at 29.
227. The court further explained:
Indeed, inconsistency with the "justified expectations of the other party"
and the violation of "community standards of decency, fairness, or reasonableness" may demonstrate the absence of "good faith." Such an objective
test of "good faith" is not significantly different from the test of "fair
dealing." It eliminates the difficult burden of proving the motivations of
the former employer.
The rule we adopt wil not have wide implications. The amount of the
renewal commissions substantially proves the outer limit of the compensation
Gram lost for past services. In most other employment arrangements, the
"windfall" to an employer and the loss to the former employee derived
from an employee's loss of compensation for past service cannot be as clearly
identified.
Id. at 667 n.10, 429 N.E.2d at 29 n.10 (citations omitted).
228. E.g., McCone v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 393 Mass. 231, 234, 471
N.E.2d 47, 50 (1984); Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 384 Mass. 659, 671-72, 429
N.E.2d 21, 29 (1981); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 102,
364 N.E.2d 1251, 1256 (1977).
229. E.g., Maddaloni v. Western Massachusetts Bus Lines, Inc., 386 Mass.
877, 883, 438 N.E.2d 351, 352 (1982).
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In that regard, the courts have drawn a distinction between an allowable
recovery of damages for the employee's loss of reasonably ascertainable
future compensation based upon past services,2 0 and disallowing compensation for future services.23' The effect of this characterization generally is
to lessen the amount of damages allowed. For example, in Maddaloni v.
Western Mass. Bus Lines, Inc.,232 the plaintiff was employed as a general
manager pursuant to a written contract which provided that the employer
would pay a commission if the plaintiff procured a special charter from the
Interstate Commerce Commission. The plaintiff was instrumental in obtaining the charter, received some commission payments, and was then discharged
by the company. The court, following Fortune, found that the defendant
had terminated plaintiff based on a bad faith attempt to avoid paying the
commissions. 233 Accordingly, the plaintiff was entitled to damages in an
amount attributable to past services, but not to lost wages and fringe benefits
23 4
unrelated to past services.
In Gram v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., (Gram 11)235 the court further
clarified the distinction between damages properly recoverable by an at-will
employee for breach of the implied covenant of good faith to prevent a
windfall to the employer and compensation for future services. 236 The court
vacated the jury's verdict on remand in Gram I because the judge improperly
submitted to the jury the issue of future career credits instead of limiting it
to renewal commissions based on past services. 23 7 Moreover, questions of
how changes in policy coverage might affect future commissions were deemed
not includable in the measure of damages.? 8
230. See Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 384 Mass. 659, 671-72, 429 N.E.2d
21, 29 (1981); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 104-05, 364
N.E.2d 1251, 1257 (1977).
231. See McCone v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 393 Mass. 231, 235, 471
N.E.2d 47, 50 (1984); Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 384 Mass. 659, 671-72, 429
N.E.2d 21, 29 (1981).
232. 386 Mass. 877, 438 N.E.2d 351 (1982).
233. Id. at 881, 438 N.E.2d at 355.
234. Id. at 882, 438 N.E.2d at 356. The court stated:
In Fortune v. NationalCash Register Co., and Gram v. Liberty Mutual Ins.
Co., we imposed an obligation of good faith and fair dealing to prevent an
employer from being unjustly enriched by depriving the employee of money
that he had fairly earned and legitimately expected. However, a majority do
not believe that 'an employee should be entitled to benefits which he neither
contemplated nor included in his contract.
Id."(citations omitted).
235. 391 Mass. 333, 461 N.E.2d 796 (1984).
236. Id. at 335, 461 N.E.2d at 798.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 335-36, 461 N.E.2d at 798-99. The court held:
Although the question is not free from doubt, we conclude that commissions
on future endorsements and the consequences of any anticipated future
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Similarly, the Massachusetts Supreme Court in McCone v. New England
Telephone and Telegraph Co.,2 9 determined that job evaluations conducted
in bad faith, which resulted in demotions or lost salary increases, did not
constitute a breach of the implied covenant of good faith. 4 The plaintiffs
had received job evaluations which were not based upon their actual performance. Rather, the employer had completed the evaluations in such a way
as to satisfy the requirements of a predetermined Bell Curve. The court denied
the plaintiffs compensation for potential lost salary raises and corresponding
unvested pension benefits because the defendant employer did not, as alleged
in Fortune, stand to gain any pecuniary windfall from the method of evaluations.
In the same vein, the court in Jordan v. Duff and Phelps, Inc. 2 recently
characterized the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment relationships as functioning to prevent either party from taking
"opportunistic advantage" of the other:
Employment creates occasions for opportunism. A firm may fire an employee the day before his pension vests, or a salesman the day before a large
commission becomes payable. Cases of this sort may present difficult questions about the reasons for the decision (was it opportunism, or was it a
decline in the employee's performance?). The difficulties of separating opportunistic conduct from honest differences of opinion about an employee's
performance on the job may lead firms and their employees to transact on
terms that keep such disputes out of court-which employment at will usually
does. But no one... doubts that an avowedly opportunistic discharge is a
breach of contract, although the employment is at-will.-I
inflation should not be included in the measure of Gram's damages. Future
policy changes and future premium levels are speculative. We think that
Gram's damages should be measured by the amount of annual renewal
commissions payable under his compensation agreement in effect at the time
of his discharge, recognizing the renewal of coverage but disregarding the
effect of endorsements. Attrition in the block of business produced by Gram
should be determined for each future year of his anticipated employment,
and anticipated future renewal commissions should be adjusted to present
value. The calculation of Gram's damages should also reflect the proportion
of Gram's time that would have been devoted to servicing renewal policies,
but, because we exclude the effects of endorsements in measuring the renewal
commissions recoverable, the portion of Gram's time reasonably expected
to be devoted to servicing renewals should not include time devoted to
handling endorsements.
Id. at 336, 461 N.E.2d at 799.
239. 393 Mass. 231, 471 N.E.2d 47 (1984).
240. Id. at 234, 471 N.E.2d at 50.
241. Id.
242. 815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987).
243. Id. at 438.
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Thus, Massachusetts courts have narrowly tailored the good faith covenant
to serve as the basis for applying restitutionary principles for at-will employees. If an employer stands to gain a financial advantage as a result of
the discharge, the court will find a breach of the good faith covenant and
will award damages based upon the employee's vested or accrued benefits.
Conversely, where the employer would not be unjustly enriched, as in McCone,
then the good faith covenant will not protect employees from abusive behavior by an employer. The good faith covenant, though, should not be
limited only to restitutionary principles because, as shown in Part III. A., it
encompasses protection of the broader justifiable expectancy of employees
not to be treated in bad faith.
D.

The Interplay of Public Policy and Good Faith

A number of courts have recognized an exception to the employment
at-will rule where an employer may be held liable in tort if the discharge of
an employee contravenes some important public policy. 4 An early expression
of the public policy theory is found in Kouff v. Bethlehem Alameda Shipyard, 4 where the court held that the firing of an employee in retaliation for
serving as an election officer justified tort remedies against the employer
because a state statute expressly prohibited such discharges.7 Courts began
to expand the public policy limitation to include any discharge which violated
a statute, even where the statute was silent with respect to sanctions "2 7 More
244. E.g., Wiskotoni v. Michigan Nat'l Bank - West, 716 F.2d 378, 388 (6th
Cir. 1983); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 177, 610 P.2d 1330,
1335, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 844 (1980); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179
Conn. 471, 480, 427 A.2d 385, 387 (1980); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,
84 N.J. 58, 65, 417 A.2d 505, 512 (1980); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d
270, 275 (W. Va. 1978). In Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319
A.2d 174 (1974), the court explained public policy as the basis for liability in wrongful
discharge:
It may be granted that there are areas of an employee's life in which his
employer has no legitimate interest. An intrusion into one of these areas by
virtue of the employer's power of discharge might plausibly give rise to a
cause of action particularly where some recognized facet of public policy is
threatened. The notion that substantive due process elevates an employer's
privilege of hiring and discharging his employees to an absolute constitutional right has long since been discredited.
Geary, 456 Pa. at 184, 319 A.2d at 180.
245. 90 Cal. App. 2d 322, 202 P.2d 1059 (1949).
246. Id. at 324, 202 P.2d at 1061.
247. See, e.g., Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975). In Nees, an
employer who discharged an employee for absenteeism from work due to serving on
jury duty, was held liable for compensatory damages. The Nees court stated:
These actions by the people, the legislature and the courts clearly indicate
that the jury system and jury duty are regarded as high on the scale of
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the public policy exception by prediredefined
courts
have
recently, some
and decisional law.248
statutory
cating liability on constitutional,
The rationale behind the public policy theory has been expressed as
follows:
[U]nchecked employer power, like unchecked employee power, has been seen
to present a distinct threat to the public policy carefully considered and
adopted by society as a whole. As a result, it is now recognized that a pr6per
balance must be maintained among the employer's interest in operating a
business efficiently and profitably, the employee's interest in earning a livelihood, and society's interest in seeing its public policies carried out.4 9
Definitional problems, called the "Achilles heel of the principle,"250 have
accompanied the geometric increase in the use of public policy to circumscribe
American institutions and citizen obligations. If an employer were permitted
with impunity to discharge an employee for fulfilling her obligation of jury
duty, the jury system would be adversely affected. The will of the community
would be thwarted. For these reasons we hold that the defendants are liable
for discharging plaintiff because she served on the jury.
Id. at 214, 536 P.2d at 516.
248. See, e.g., Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 710
P.2d 1025 (1985); Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Haw. 370, 652 P.2d 625
(1982); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980);
Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984). In
Wagenseller, the court stated:
We do not believe, however, that expressions of public policy are contained
only in the statutory and constitutional law, nor do we believe that all
statements made in either a statute or the constitution are expressions of
public policy. Turning first to the identification of other sources, we note
our agreement with the following: "Public policy is usually defined by the
political branches of government. Something against public policy is something that the Legislature has forbidden. But the legislature is not the only
source of such policy. In common-law jurisdictions the courts too have been
sources of law, always subject to legislative correction, and with progressively
less freedom as legislation occupies a given field. It is the courts, to give an
example, that originated the whole doctrine that certain kinds of businesses
- common carriers and innkeepers - must serve the public without discrimination or preference. In this sense, then, courts make law, and they
have done so for years."
Wagenseller, 147 Ariz. at __ 710 P.2d at 1033-34 (citations omitted). The court
further concluded:
Thus, we believe that reliance on prior judicial decisions, as part of the
body of applicable common law, is appropriate, although we agree with the
Hawaii Supreme Court that "courts should proceed cautiously if called upon
to declare public policy absent some prior legislative or judicial expression
on the subject." Thus, we will look to the pronouncements of our founders,
our legislature, and our courts to discern the public policy of this state.
Id. (citations omitted).
249. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 130, 421 N.E.2d
876, 878 (1981).
250. Id.
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conduct.
Thus,
in the leading case of Petermann v. International
employer
Bhd. of Teamsters,2' the court recognized that "[t]he term 'public policy'
is inherently not subject to precise definition ... Public policy is a vague

expression ....
',252 Similarly, in Palmateerv. InternationalHarvesterCo.,25
the court stated:
But what constitutes clearly mandated public policy? There is no precise
definition of the term. In general, it can be said that public policy concerns
what is right and just and what affects the citizens of the State collectively.
It is to be found in the State's constitution and statutes and, when they are
silent, in its judicial decisions. Although there is no precise line of demarcation dividing matters that are the subject of public policy from matters
purely personal, a survey of cases in other States involving retaliatory discharges shows that a matter must strike at the heart of a citizen's social
rights, duties, and responsibilities before "the tort will be allowed. 4
Other courts, perhaps in an attempt to prevent wholesale abandonment of
the at-will doctrine, have required a threshold showing of a "clear mandate"
of public policy"' or have restricted the foundation to constitutional or statutory sources .36

The factual scenarios giving rise to application of the public policy exception may be broken down into three general categories. The first broad
grouping is where an employer discharges an employee in retaliation for the
employee's refusal to commit an unlawful act.2 7 The nature and character
of such acts has been extremely varied, and have included instances where
employees refused to commit perjury,25s violate antitrust laws, 259 practice
251. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
252. Id. at 188, 344 P.2d at 27.
253. 85 11.2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
254. Id. at 130, 421 N.E.2d at 878 (citation omitted).
255. See Pamar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Haw. 370, 380, 652 P.2d 625,
631 (1982); Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 184, 319 A.2d 174, 180
(1974); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 232-33, 685 P.2d 1081,
1089 (1984).
256. See Brockmeyer v. Dunn & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 577-79, 335
N.W.2d 834, 841 (1983).
257. E.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330,
164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980); Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal.
App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959); Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton R.R., 81
Mich. App. 489, 265 N.W.2d 385 (1978).
258. See, e.g., Petermann, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25. The court in
Petermann stated:
The commission of perjury is unlawful. It is also a crime to solicit the
commission of perjury. The presence of false testimony in any proceeding,
tends to interfere with the proper administration of public affairs and the
administration of justice. It would be obnoxious to the interests of the state
and contrary to public policy and sound morality to allow an employer to
discharge any employee, whether the employment be for a designated or
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certain medical procedures without a license, 260 or violate an indecent ex26
posure statute. '
A second basis of liability has been found where the employer discharges
an employee for performing public responsibilities such as jury duty262 or

testifying before a grand jury. 263 This category also has embraced instances
where an employee was fired for "blowing the whistle" 26 on illegal activities
of the employer or co-workers.
Third, courts have imposed protection from traditional at-will discharge
for employees who have been terminated in retaliation for exercising a legal
right or privilege. 265 Typical examples of proscribed conduct fitting this area
unspecified duration, on the ground that the employee declined to commit

perjury, an act specifically enjoined by statute. The threat of criminal prosecution would, in many cases, be a sufficient deterrent upon both the employer and employee, the former from soliciting and the latter from
committing perjury. However, in order to more fully effectuate the state's
declared policy against perjury, the civil law, too, must deny the employer
his generally unlimited right to discharge an employee whose employment
is for an unspecified duration, when the reason for the dismissal is the
employee's refusal to commit perjury. To hold otherwise would be without
reason and contrary to the spirit of the law. The public policy of this state
as reflected in the penal code sections referred to above would be seriously
impaired if it were to be held that one could be discharged by reason of his
refusal to commit perjury. To hold that one's continued employment could
be made contingent upon his commission of a felonious act at the instance
of this employer would be to encourage criminal conduct upon the part of
both the employee and the employer and would serve to contaminate the
honest administration of public affairs. This is patently contrary to the public
welfare. The law must encourage and not discourage truthful testimony. The
public policy of this state requires that every impediment, however remote
to the above objective, must be struck down when encountered.
Id. at 188-89, 344 P.2d at 27 (citations omitted).
259. See, e.g., McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Pa. 1979);
Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr.

839 (1980); Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Haw. 370, 652 P.2d 625 (1982).

260. See, e.g., O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 160 N.J. Super. 416, 390 A.2d 149 (1978).
261. See, e.g., Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 710
P.2d 1025 (1985).
262. E.g., Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975); Reuther v. Fowler
& Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978).
263. E.g., Wiskotoni v. Michigan Nat'l Bank - West, 716 F.2d 378 (6th Cir.
1978).
264. See Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330,
164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471,
427 A.2d 385 (1980); Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174
(1974); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978). See generally
Malin, Protectingthe WhistleblowerFrom RetaliatoryDischarge, 16 MIcH. J.L. REF.
277 (1983).
265. Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979);
Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Frampton v. Central
Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973).
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would be where an employer discharges an employee for filing a claim under
the worker's compensation laws2 or engaging in union activities,26 7 although
it has also been more expansively interpreted to protect constitutional guarantees of free speech.2 3
The difficulties of defining public policy and the varied factual situations
in which a legally protected policy expression may arise have presented courts
with problems of clearly articulating standards to determine liability on a
consistent basis. Additionally, some courts have complicated the analysis
further by intermingling public policy considerations with the protections
afforded by the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 269 The
confusion caused by this unfortunate overlay of two distinct bases of liability
for wrongful discharge is exacerbated by those courts which have required
a showing of a public policy mandate as a preliminary requirement before
reaching the merits of liability under the implied good faith covenant. 270
Two examples where courts have examined the interplay of public policy
and good faith are Cort v. Bristol-Myers Co. 271 and Wagenseller v. Scottsdale
Memorial Hospital.272 In Cort, the Massachusetts Supreme Court further
narrowed the scope of Fortuneby holding that an at-will employee discharged
without cause did not have a claim for bad faith termination although the
employer gave a false reason or pretext for the discharge. 273 Cort is distinguishable from prior Massachusetts decisions in that the plaintiff alleged
neither wrongful deprivation of earned commissions (as in Fortune)nor the
loss of reasonably ascertainable future compensation based on prior services
(as in Gram 1). The significance of Cort, however, is that the court enunciated
as a second basis for potential employer liability that the reason for discharge
266. Kelsay, 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353; Frampton, 260 Ind. 249, 297
N.E.2d 425.
267. Krystad v. Lau, 65 Wash. 2d 827, 400 P.2d 72 (1965).
268. See Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983). In

Novosel, the court stated:

Given that there are no statutory remedies available in the present case and

taking into consideration the importance of the political and associational

freedoms of the federal and state Constitutions, the absence of a statutory

declaration of public policy would appear to be no bar to the existence of
a cause of action. Accordingly, a cognizable expression of public policy may
be derived in this case from either the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution or Article I, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
Id. at 899.
269. See Wynn v. Boeing Military Airplane Co., 595 F. Supp. 727 (D. Kan.

1984); Cort v. Bristol-Myers Co., 385 Mass. 300, 431 N.E.2d 908 (1982); Crowell v.
Transamerica Delaware, Inc., 206 N.J. Super. 298, 502 A.2d 573 (1984).
270. See Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d
1025 (1985); Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., 193 Conn. 558, 479 A.2d 781 (1984).
271. 385 Mass. 300, 431 N.E.2d 908 (1982).
272. 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025 (1985).
273. Cort, 385 Mass. at 303, 431 N.E.2d at 911.
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contravened some important public policy. 274 The court stated, "The employer's predatory motivation in the Fortunecase can be classified as a reason
contrary to public policy." 275 This language unfortunately mixes public policy
analysis with the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 276 The
public policy limitation on the right of an employer to terminate an at-will
employee should be viewed as an entirely separate basis for liability.
Another instance involving the interplay of public policy theory and the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as limitations on the power
of employers to discharge at-will employees occurred in Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hospital.277 In that case, the plaintiff was employed in a
management position as paramedic coordinator by the defendant hospital.
The plaintiff had consistently received positive job performance evaluations,
but was terminated after the relationship with her supervisor deteriorated
following a camping and rafting trip with other hospital personnel. The
plaintiff refused to participate in certain activities during the outing which
arguably would have violated the state's indecent exposure statute. The Arizona Supreme Court held that the defendant could not fire the plaintiff for
a bad cause contrary to the "public policy articulated by constitutional,
statutory, or decisional law." 27
With respect to the plaintiff's claim that the employer's conduct also
constituted a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
however, a different result obtained. The court stated that the good faith
covenant was implicit in the employment contract but served only to prevent
the hospital from reaping a windfall of financial benefits earned by the
employee for past services. 279 The court denied any compensation for prospective employment benefits because "the Hospital made no promise of
continued employment. To the contrary, [the contract, being at-will,] was,
by its nature subject to termination by either party at any time, subject only
to the legal prohibition that she could not be fired for reasons which contravene public policy."' 2 0 Finally, stating its concerns that the discretion of
an employer in managing the work force should not be unduly restricted and
that tenure was inconsistent with employment at-will, the court held that a
no cause termination did not violate the implied good faith covenant.ul
274. Id. at 302, 431 N.E.2d at 910.
275. Id.
276. See Wynn v. Boeing Military Airplane Co., 595 F. Supp. 727, 728-29 (D.
Kan. 1984); Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 120 N.H. 295, 297, 414 A.2d 1273, 1274
(1980); Crowell v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 206 N.J. Super. 298, -, 502 A.2d
573, 574-75 (1984).
277. 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025 (1985).
278. Id. at 381, 710 P.2d at 1036.
279. Id. at 385, 710 P.2d at 1040.
280. Id. at 386, 710 P.2d at 1041.
281. Id.
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The court's analysis is troubling in several respects. Significantly, the
court improperly viewed the public policy exception to wrongful discharge
as being co-extensive with the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
The factual basis which justified application of the public policy exception
in tort should also have been sufficient to form the predicate for a separate
and independent cause of action sounding in contract for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. This distinction becomes
even more important to an aggrieved employee if the tort action for violations
of public policy is unavailable either because the necessary public policy
expression cannot be found or, on a more pragmatic level, if the shorter tort
282
statute of limitations has already run.
The Wagenseller facts provide an excellent illustration of the potential
combination of tort and contract theory because the plaintiff had been discharged for a "bad cause" where the termination ran afoul of an Arizona
public policy embodied in certain criminal statutes. The bad cause discharge
was sufficient to violate public policy, and it certainly should have amounted
also to a breach of the implied contractual covenant of good faith. What
also makes Wagenseller interesting is that the hospital stood to derive no
ascertainable pecuniary benefit from discharging the plaintiff. Therefore, the
restitutionary component of the good faith covenant was not in issue. The
court should have recognized that the discharged employee had a separate
contractual expectation not to be fired for a "bad cause" which was distinct
both from restitutionary theory and from the public policy exception.
In conclusion, there are several reasons why the public policy and good
faith theories of liability should not be viewed as necessarily- co-extensive.
First, the policy underpinnings with respect to implied contract rights and
public policy protections differ-the former focus on the expectations of the
parties based upon the contract itself,u3 while the latter serve a broader
purpose of ensuring protection of rights shared by the general public irrespective of agreement or status. 2 4 Secondly, the factual predicate which evidences a bad faith discharge may or may not be co-extensive with that
justifying application of the public policy exception. This point is critical
because some courts limit the applicability of the public policy exception to
certain narrowly defined circumstances, 285 while the covenant of good faith
282. See Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198
(1958); Eisenberg v. Insurance Co. of North America, 815 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1987).
283. Wagenseller, 147 Ariz. at -, 710 P.2d at 1040.
284. Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Haw. 370, 377-78, 652 P.2d 625,
631 (1982).
285. See, e.g., Darlington v. General Elec., 350 Pa. Super. 183, -,
504
A.2d 306, 318 (1986). In Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., 193 Conn. 558, 479 A.2d 781
(1984), Associate Justice Parskey, concurring in part and dissenting in part, aptly
provided the following illustration of why the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
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and fair dealing should be read into all contracts.28 6 Finally, the remedial
consequences of the two theories may differ substantially. The public policy
exception sounds in tort and may permit assessment of both compensatory
and punitive damages. 28 7 Courts are split, however, as to whether a breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing should carry tort as
well as contractual remedies. 281 Moreover the statute of limitations and the
propriety of awarding attorney's fees may differ depending upon whether
the cause of action is characterized in tort or in contract.U9
E. Breach of the Good Faith Covenant: Contract vs. Tort Theory
Courts have split over the question whether a breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing sounds in contract, 29 tort, 291 or both. 292 For
example, in Fortune v. National Cash Register Co. ,293 the Massachusetts

Supreme Court recognized the efficacy of a tort action to remedy a violation
should be a separate legal basis for recovery from the public policy exception:
Assume that an employer falsely accuses an employee of theft of the employer's property. Assume further that the employer insists on the employee
signing a statement admitting to the theft and upon the employee's refusal
terminates the employment. Under these facts the employee should be able
to bring an action for wrongful discharge in two counts, one based on a
bad faith breach of the implied covenant, the other on a retaliatory discharge
in violation of the public policy. If, in such case, the plaintiff can prove
that he was discharged on the basis of a false accusation of theft but could
not prove that the employer demanded that he sign a false statement then
his failure to recover on the second should not preclude recovery on the
first count.
Magnan, 193 Conn. at 580, 479 A.2d at 792-93.
286. Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 453, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 722, 727-28 (1980).
287. Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Haw. 370, 378, 652 P.2d 625, 631
(1982).
288. See Koehrer v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1155, 1171, 226 Cal.
Rptr. 820, 828 (1986); Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 45556, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 730 (1980); Gates v. Life of Montana Ins. Co., 196 Mont.
178, 185, 638 P.2d 1063, 1067 (1982). Compare Murray v. Bridgeport Hosp., 40
Conn. Supp. 56, -, 480 A.2d 610, 612 (1984); Fortune v. National Cash Register
Co., 373 Mass. 96, 102, 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1256 (1977).
289. Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 662, 328 P.2d
198, 203 (1958).:
290. Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 102, 364 N.E.2d
1251, 1256 (1977).
291. E.g., K-Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364, 1369 (Nev. 1987).
292. E.g., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 430, 426 P.2d 173, 178,
58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 19 (1967); Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654,
660, 328 P.2d 198, 203 (1958); Cubic Corp. v. Marty, 185 Cal. App. 3d 438,
229 Cal. Rptr. 828, 837 (1986).
293. 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977).
-,
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of public policy, but determined that breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing would appropriately be remedied by a contract action. 294
In contrast, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Brockmeyer v. Dunn &
Bradstreet29S adopted a restrictive approach by holding that contract rather
than tort remedies should be applied in all wrongful discharge cases, including
those involving a violation of public policy. 296 Characterization as a tort
action rather than breach of contract has certain direct remedial consequences, including the recoverability of attorney's fees, 29 possible assessment
of punitive damages, 298 and a shorter statute of limitations.
A breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was
first treated as giving rise to an action in tort in the insurance context. In
Comunale v. Traders & GeneralInsuranceCo.,100 the court characterized the
covenant as sounding in both contract and tort, giving the plaintiff freedom
of election for statute of limitations purposesA0 1 Similarly, in Crisci v. Security Insurance Co.,302 the court allowed recovery of damages to compensate
an insured for a judgment in a personal injury action and for mental suffering
294. Id. at 101, 364 N.E.2d at 1256.
295. 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983).
296. Id. at 574-75, 335 N.W.2d at 841. The court stated:
Whether the cause of action for wrongful discharge should be maintained
in tort or contract or both needs to be resolved. Those cases implying a
contractual term of good faith dealing sounded in contract. Most, though
not all of the public policy exception cases from other states were tort
actions. The most significant distinction in our view between the two causes
of action in wrongful discharge suits is in the damages that may be recovered.
In tort actions, the only limitations are those of "proximate cause" or public
policy considerations. Punitive damages are also allowed. In contract actions, damages are limited by the concepts of foreseeability and mitigation.
The remedies established by the majority of Wisconsin wrongful discharge
statutes are limited to reinstatement and backpay, contractual remedy concepts. We believe that reinstatement and backpay are the most appropriate
remedies for public policy exception wrongful discharges since the primary
concern in these actions is to make the wronged employee "whole." Therefore, we conclude that a contract action is most appropriate for wrongful
discharges. The contract action is essentially predicated on the breach of an
implied provision that an employer will not discharge an employee for refusing to perform an act that violates a clear mandate of public policy. Tort
actions cannot be maintained.
Id.
297. Sawyer v. Bank of America, 83 Cal. App. 3d 135, 140, 145 Cal. Rptr.
623, 626 (1978).
298. K-Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364, 1373 (Nev. 1987).
299. Eisenberg v. Insurance Co. of North America, 815 F.2d 1285, 1291-92
(9th Cir. 1987); Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 662, 328 P.2d
198, 203 (1958).
300. 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
301. Id. at 663, 328 P.2d at 203.
302. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
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as a result of the insurer's wrongful failure to settle.303 In Crisci, with regard
to the availability of the tort action, the court stated:
Fundamental in our jurisprudence is the principle that for every wrong there
is a remedy and that an injured party should be compensated for all damage
proximately caused by a wrongdoer. Although we recognize exceptions from
departure should be sanctioned unless there
these fundamental principles, no
3°
is a strong necessity therefore. 4
Central to the imposition of tort remedies for breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing was the notion that a "special relationship"
existed between the insurer and insured, characterized by a public interest
in, and a fiduciary responsibility to protect, the interests of the insured3 °5
In Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc., v. StandardOil Co. ,30the Supreme
Court of California considered whether the implied covenant of good faith
in a non-insurance, commercial context would permit application of tort
remedies. 3°7 The court acknowledged the emphasis on the special relationship
between insurer and insured as a key factor in the tort analysis303 but, with
an expression of caution, left open the question of whether it should be
applied in other relationships:
When we move from such special relationships to consideration of the tort
remedy in the context of the ordinary commercial contract, we move into
largely uncharted and potentially dangerous waters. Here, parties of roughly
equal bargaining power are free to shape the contours of their agreement
and to include provisions for attorney fees and liquidated damages in the
event of breach. They may not be permitted to disclaim the covenant of
good faith but they are free, within reasonable limits at least, to agree upon
the standards by which application of the covenant is to be measured.
In such contracts, it may be difficult to distinguish between breach of
the covenant and breach of contract, and there is the risk that interjecting
tort remedies will intrude upon the expectations of the parties. This is not
to say that tort remedies have no place in such a commercial context, but
that it is wise
to proceed with caution in determining their scope and ap309
plication.
The court determined that a contracting party would be subject to tort liability when it breached the contract and attempted "to shield itself from
303. Id. at 434, 426 P.2d at 178-79, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
304. Id. at 433, 426 P.2d at 178, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
305. Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 36 Cal.
3d 752, 768, 686 P.2d 1158, 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 362 (1984); K-Mart Corp. v.
Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364, 1370-71 (Nev. 1987).
306. 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984).
307. Id. at 767, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
308. Id. at 768, 686 P.2d at 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
309. Id. at 769, 686 P.2d at 1166-67, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362-63.
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liability by denying, in bad faith and without probable cause, that the con' 310
tract exists.
An issue left unresolved in Seaman's was whether other relationships
possessed the indicia of a fiduciary character and public interest sufficient
to apply tort and contract remedies. Several recent breach of employment
contract cases, 3"' both in California and elsewhere, have answered in the
affirmative. In K-Mart Corporationv. Ponsock,312 for example, the Nevada
Supreme Court held that the employer's discharge of the plaintiff in order
to deprive him of retirement benefits constituted a tortious breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing which justified a jury award of
compensatory and punitive damages. 3 3 The court distinguished situations
where an employer would be subject to contractual remedies for its failure
to provide requisite notices or other agreed protections versus those instances
where the employer acted in bad faith. 314 Thus, breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing would justify tort remedies only in situations
evidencing a "special relationship" between the parties, such as in insurance,
partnership and franchise agreements.3" 5 The court, limiting its inquiry to the
particular relationship between the plaintiff and defendant, determined that
sufficient elements of special reliance existed to assess tort liability. 3 6 The
court posited a dual rationale in support of its holding - that contract
damages would not make the plaintiff whole0317 and that such egregious con310. Id. at 769, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
311. Koehrer v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1155, 1171, 226 Cal. Rptr.
820, 829 (1986); K-Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364, 1371 (Nev. 1987).
312. 732 P.2d 1364 (Nev. 1987).
313. Id. at 1365. The court determined that certain provisions in an employee
handbook issued by K-Mart modified the plaintiff's employment contract, making

his status a tenured employee "until retirement" rather than being at-will. Id.
314. Id. at 1370.
315. Id. at 1370-71. The court reasoned:

The bad faith discharge case finds its origins in the so-called covenant
of good faith and fair dealing implied in law in every contract. The fact
that such a covenant exists by legislative fiat most certainly does not mean

that out of every contract can emanate a tort action. Still, oftentimes tortious
conduct arises out of or is related to a contractual relationship. A tort,

however, requires the presence of a duty created by law, not merely a duty
created by contract; and, although a duty of good faith and fair dealing is
created by law in all cases, it is only in rare and exceptional cases that the

duty is of such a nature as to give rise to tort liability. The kind of breach
of duty that brings into play the bad faith tort arises only when there are
special relationships between the tort-victim and the tortfeasor as described

below.
Id. at 1370 (citations omitted).

316. Id. at 1372.
317. Id. at 1371. The court stated:
One of the underlying rationales for extending tort liability in the described

kinds of cases is that ordinary contract damages do not adequately com-
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duct on the part of the defendant should be deterred. 318 Accordingly, an
award of punitive damages was merited. 19
Ponsock and several recent California lower court cases 320 have interpreted Seaman's as drawing a distinction between breaches of an employment
contract which give rise only to contractual remedies and situations where
tort remedies may exist; the latter being evidenced, for example, by an employer's bad faith motivation of frustrating or depriving the employee of
contract rights.321 Thus, the availability of tort remedies for breach of the
good faith covenant thus apparently turns upon whether some "plus factor"
is present beyond a breach of contract by the employer. This plus factor
may be a retaliatory response to certain employee conduct (which would find
protection in the public policy exception) or, on a more mercenary level,
may simply be the employer's attempt to gain a pecuniary benefit at the
expense of an employee. Inquiries into employer motivations in discharging
an employee may fail for lack of evidence if approached too subjectively.
pensate the victim because they do not require the party in the superior or
entrusted position, such as the insurer, the partner, or the franchiser, to
account adequately for grievous and perfidious misconduct; and contract
damages do not make the aggrieved, weaker, "trusting" party "whole."
Id.
318. Id. at 1372.
319. Id. at 1373. The court stated:
The use of punitive damages in appropriate cases of breach of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing expresses society's disapproval of exploitation
by a superior power and creates a strong incentive for employers to conform
to clearly defined legal duties. Such duties are so explicit and so subject of
common understanding as to justify the punitive award.
Id.
320.

See Koehrer v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1155, 226 Cal. Rptr.

820 (1986); Khanna v. Microdata Corp., 170 Cal. App. 3d 250, 215 Cal. Rptr. 860
(1985).
321. See Koehrer v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1155, 1171, 226 Cal.
Rptr. 820, 829 (1986); Khanna v. Microdata Corp., 170 Cal. App. 3d 250, 262-63,
215 Cal. Rptr. 860, 867 (1985); K-Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364, 1370 (Nev.
1987). This dichotomy was stated by the court in Koehrer as follows:
In our view the standard developed in Seaman's is appropriate to distinguish
between the simple breach of an employment contract by discharge of the
employee without good cause and a breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing affording tort remedies. If the employer merely disputes his liability under the contract by asserting in good faith and with
probable cause that good cause existed for discharge, the implied covenant
is not violated and the employer is not liable in tort. If, however, the
existence of good cause for discharge is asserted by the employer without
probable cause and in bad faith, that is, without a good faith belief that
good cause for discharge in fact exists, the employer has tortiously attempted
to deprive the employee of the benefits of the agreement, and an action for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing will lie.
Koehrer, 181 Cal. App. 3d at 1170-71, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 829 (citation omitted).
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Therefore, bad faith should be measured, if possible, by an objective standard.
The divergent viewpoints concerning treatment of a breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing as sounding in contract or in tort
may be harmonized. The tort duty may be manifested in expressions of public
policy or in those circumstances where an employer's conduct in discharging
the employee is so egregious that it demands deterrence. Otherwise, characterization as a contract action should control.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The employment at-will doctrine gives the employer the absolute free-

dom, without risk of incurring liability, to discharge an employee who is not
otherwise protected by public law, a collective bargaining agreement, or a
private contract. Courts have limited this harsh common law rule by recognizing a tort cause of action to redress employer conduct which contravenes

some important public policy, by recognizing that job security rights may be
implied-in-fact in the employment contract, and by acknowledging an implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing that the employer shall
not act in a manner which deprives an employee of the benefits of the

employment agreement.
Whether specific statements by an employer concerning job security may
be properly characterized as an implied-in-fact modification of the employment contract should be evaluated by the objective manifestations of intent
by the employer. If the employer reasonably expects compliance with the
terms of a personnel manual or handbook, and by their issuance and dissemination intends to promote an expectation of job security, then courts
should treat the provisions as enforceable promises.
The objection that an employee must provide new and independent consideration apart from his contemplated job services should be rejected in
favor of the view that a single performance can furnish consideration for
multiple promises and that courts should not inquire into the adequacy of
consideration. This approach has the further practical advantage of relieving
courts of the necessity of making tenuous determinations of whether the
independent consideration test is satisfied by an employee's longevity of
service, foregoing other job opportunities, or relocating to take the position.
Moreover, the objection that mutuality of obligation is lacking because an
at-will employee is not bound to continue working for a given employer is
similarly outmoded and should be discarded. The relevant inquiry should
instead be whether or not the employment contract initially was supported
by sufficient consideration.
Implied promises of job security have been rendered unenforceable in
certain instances by disclaimers made by employers in the policy manual or
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handbook. Application and interpretation of disclaimer provisions has been
inconsistent and unpredictable due, in large part, to a fundamental misconception concerning the label "disclaimer" and its proper function. The term
"disclaimer" necessarily implies that substantive rights would otherwise be
enjoyed by one party but for being excluded or modified by the disclaimer.
In the unilateral employment contract setting, though, such a characterization
is inaccurate because the provision does not limit or extinguish existing rights.
Instead, the "disclaimer" operates to temper statements concerning job security so that they are not elevated to the level of enforceable promises. The
distinction is more than a semantic exercise because of certain derivative
issues pertinent to disclaimers, such as whether the statement must be "conspicuous," whether inconsistent representations negate its effect, and whether
employee reliance and the timing of issuance negate the statements' effectiveness. Courts could avoid these problems by treating "disclaimer" language
as evidentiary of whether the employer objectively intended employees to
comply with the particular terms. If so, then reliance by all employees on
the provisions should be presumed and the language should be implied-infact as enforceable promises into the employment contract. If not, then the
handbook provisions should not be characterized as binding contractual
promises.
The at-will doctrine should be modified to continue to allow the discharge of employees for good cause or no cause, but should be circumscribed
by an implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing which would
prevent firings for a "bad cause." The covenant should be implied by courts
in all employment contracts and, to have meaning, must be nonwaivable and
nondisclaimable.
The policy against bad faith discharges should properly be reflected in
both tort and contract rights and duties. The tort duty should be narrowly
tailored to provide redress against discharges which either violate public policy or, absent public policy implications, against instances of particularly
egregious employer conduct. Courts must recognize that the public policy
exception to the at-will rule is not co-extensive with the implied contractual
covenant of good faith and fair dealing but merely reflects one aspect of the
general policy against bad faith discharges. The public policy exception principally reflects a societal interest in the observance of statutory and constitutional law, while the contractual covenant of good faith safeguards relations
of the employer and employee inter se.
The policy against bad faith discharges includes protection of the employee's expectancy, reliance, and restitution interests in the employment
arrangement. Following the lead of the Massachusetts decisions, courts have
begun to recognize that restitutionary principles require that an employer not
be unjustly enriched at the expense of an at-will employee. The covenant of
good faith, however, must also be recognized to protect the expectancy and
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reliance interests of employees. Although at-will employees by definition have
no justifiable expectation of continued or life-time employment, nor to be
discharged only for "good cause," it is reasonable to expect protection against
a bad faith dismissal. Recognition of this expectancy interest properly accommodates the balance between employer discretion in managing a work
force and an employee's interest in job security, and is consonant with the
overriding principle of good faith contractual performance.
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